This chapter presents an institutional theory of miscalculation on the road to war. The central proposition is that leaders face a trade-off between good information and political security. This trade-off is discussed in two parts. The chapter first discusses the informational constraints faced by leaders contemplating beginning an international crisis, explaining why integrated institutions that feature inclusive and open information flows tend to deliver better information to leaders. The chapter then discusses the political logic by which many leaders choose to forgo integrated institutions in favor of institutional alternatives that deliver less complete and less accurate information but provide political protection from bureaucratic punishment.

This chapter extends the analysis in Chapter 6 by examining the origins and consequences of national security institutions in Pakistan from 1947 to 2015. Unlike India, the persistent threat of bureaucratic punishment prevented the emergence of integrated institutions, despite the salient international threats faced by its political leaders. Instead, Pakistan has cycled between siloed and fragmented institutions, with civilian leaders tending to adopt the former and military rulers tending to choose the latter. The chapter argues that the reason for this pattern stems from differences in political agenda. Military leaders have historically pursued ambitious programs to transform Pakistan’s society and economy, which would allow the military to return to the barracks. A medium-n analysis of Pakistan’s institutional performance suggests that siloed and fragmented institutions tended to perform poorly relative to India’s integrated institutions. Process tracing of the 1999 Kargil War illustrates that this poor performance can be attributed to low-quality bureaucratic information upon which Pakistan’s leaders based their choice for conflict.

This chapter extends the analysis of the origins and consequences of China’s national security institutions into the post-Mao era. It first discusses the political reasons why fragmented institutions persisted after Mao’s death and why Chinese leaders subsequently opted for siloed, rather than integrated, institutions. It then presents a medium-n analysis exploring the differences in crisis performance between fragmented and siloed institutions. The decision-making processes leading to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the 2001 EP-3 Crisis demonstrate the distinct pathways by which fragmented and siloed institutions cause leaders to miscalculate. Whereas Chinese leaders received incomplete information prior to the Sino-Vietnamese War because bureaucrats feared speaking truth to power, Chinese leaders received inaccurate information prior to the onset of the 2001 EP-3 Crisis because bureaucrats were dissuaded from contesting one another’s reporting. Both cases advance the book’s argument regarding the importance of information quality as opposed to political accountability.