Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Bureaucracies at War examines how national security institutions shape the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders base their choice for conflict – which institutional designs provide the best counsel, why those institutions perform better, and why many leaders fail to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provide the best information also empower the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the road to war is often the tragic consequence of how leaders resolve the trade-off between good information and political security. Employing an original cross-national data set and detailed explorations of the origins and consequences of institutions inside China, India, Pakistan, and the United States, this book explores why bureaucracy helps to avoid disaster, how bureaucratic competition produces better information, and why institutional design is fundamentally political.

‘An illuminating exploration of the role national security institutions play in international decision-making - both good and bad.’

Graham Allison - Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard University, and author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?

‘Mistakes in war are as seemingly unavoidable as they are tragic. Tyler Jost’s excellent new book highlights an unlikely source of hope: national security bureaucrats. Military and diplomatic expertise can cut through the fog of war. But will their wisdom reach leaders? In Bureaucracies at War, Jost offers a powerful theoretical framework and staggering array of evidence showing how inter-bureaucracy decision-making systems - or ‘national security institutions’ - are essential. This remarkable book has something for everyone: new concepts, original data collection, meticulous case studies, and a timely lesson about the unsung virtues of bureaucracy.’

Austin Carson - University of Chicago

‘Jost has written an outstanding book on how foreign policy decision-making is shaped by the quality and pathologies of the institutions leaders create for national security. This meticulously researched book is a tour de force, moving the debate beyond democracy versus autocracy to the choices that leaders from China to India to the United States have made in managing their bureaucracies - and their consequences for international conflict. A must read.’

Jessica Chen Weiss - Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University

‘Bureaucracies at War is a major accomplishment. In this theoretically innovative and deeply researched book, Tyler Jost reveals how domestic politics and bureaucratic structures can cause miscalculations by top leaders in the most consequential decisions they can make: those regarding war and peace.’

Thomas J. Christensen - James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations and Director of the China and the World Program, Columbia University

‘Why is it so difficult for governments to avoid misinformation and miscalculation on the road to war? Jost’s outstanding book offers a compelling theory and extensive multimethod evidence about the political trade-offs inherent in setting up intelligence institutions, providing persuasive answers to this key puzzle in international relations.’

Jessica L. P. Weeks - Professor of Political Science and H. Douglas Weaver Chair in Diplomacy and International Relations, University of Wisconsin-Madison