The article deals with food profiteering in the Bohemian Lands after the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918. The new state faced a disintegrated society in which various units continued to fight each other for an advantage in the food market. While food shortages persisted, the Czechoslovak authorities had to deal with a situation in which food rationing laws had lost some of their power to distinguish between the legal and the criminal. Moreover, collective ideas about what was right and wrong, about the victims and perpetrators of food profiteering, and of whom to punish and how, varied according to the different social and ethnic affiliations of the population. Political instrumentalization of such ideas jeopardized the postwar consolidation based on the promise of a better future. Thus, the introduction of food profiteering courts with lay judges was an attempt to institutionalize conflicts over food profiteering and to reduce the impacts of the atomization of society until the economic situation improved.

Frailty is a state of increased vulnerability to poor resolution of homeostasis after a stressor event. Frailty is most frequently assessed in the old using the Clinical Frailty Scale (CSF) which ranks frailty from 1 to 9. This assessment typically takes less than one minute and is not validated in patients with learning difficulties or those under 65 years old. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) developed guidelines that use “frailty” as one of the priority-setting criteria for how scarce, but potentially lifesaving, health care resources should be allocated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Similar guidelines have been developed elsewhere. This paper discusses the ethical implications of such rationing and argues that this is an unproven and ethically problematic form of health care rationing. It specifically discusses: (1) how the frailty ascription becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, (2) the problematic use of “frailty” in COVID-19 “triage,” (3) the circularity of the link between age and frailty, (4) indirect discrimination because of the use of a seemingly neutral criterion in health care rationing, and (5) the difficult link between comorbidities and frailty. It is found that there was no research into the use of global frailty scores as a criterion for access to acute treatment before January 2020 and so it is concerning how readily frailty scoring has been adopted to ration access to potentially lifesaving treatments. Existing gerontological frailty scoring systems have not been developed for this purpose, and repurposing them creates significant ethical issues.

The pandemic-induced economic crisis has seen a massive increase in savings as households could not spend their income. The last time that consumers were seriously rationed was during the Second World War. This article models the behaviour of households during the War years and its immediate aftermath in Ireland, Sweden, the US and UK. Savings were held in liquid form and, once the War was over and rationing eased, a consumption boom transpired. However, significant excess savings were converted into physical assets in the housing market. There is evidence that this pattern is being repeated as the Covid-19 crisis eases.

As the coronavirus pandemic intensified, many communities in the United States experienced shortages of ventilators, intensive care beds, and other medical supplies and treatments. Currently, there is no single national response to provide guidance on allocation of scarce health care resources. Accordingly, states have formulated various “triage protocols” to prioritize those who will receive care and those who may not have the same access to health care services when the population demand exceeds the supply. Triage protocols address general concepts of “fairness” under accepted medical ethics rules and the consensus is that limited medical resources “should be allocated to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people.”1 The actual utility of this utilitarian ethics approach is questionable, however, leaving many questions about what is “fair” unanswered. Saving as many people as possible during a health care crisis is a laudable goal but not at the expense of ignoring patients’s legal rights, which are not suspended during the crisis. This Article examines the triage protocols from six states to determine whose rights are being recognized and whose rights are being denied, answering the pivotal question: If there is potential for disparate impact of facially neutral state triage protocols against Black Americans and other ethnic groups, is this legally actionable discrimination? This may be a case of first impression for the courts to resolve.

“[B]lack Americans are 3.5 times more likely to die of COVID-19 than [W]hite Americans … . Latinx people are almost twice as likely to die of the disease, compared with [W]hite people.” 2

“Our civil rights laws protect the equal dignity of every human life from ruthless utilitarianism … . HHS is committed to leaving no one behind during an emergency, and this guidance is designed to help health care providers meet that goal.” — Roger Severino, Office of Civil Rights Director, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 3

As COVID-19 ravages the world, many countries are faced with the grim reality of not having enough critical-care resources to go around. Knowing what could be in store, the Thai Ministry of Public Health called for the creation of an explicit protocol to determine how these resources are to be rationed in the situation of demand exceeding supply. This paper shares the experience of developing triage criteria and a mechanism for prioritizing intensive care unit resources in a middle-income country with the potential to be applied to other low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) faced with a similar (if not more of a) challenge when responding to the global pandemic. To the best of our knowledge, this locally developed guideline would be among the first of its kind from an LMIC setting. In summary, the experience from the Thai protocol development highlights three important lessons. First, stakeholder consultation and public engagement are crucial steps to ensure the protocol reflects the priorities of society and to maintain public trust in the health system. Second, all bodies and actions proposed in the protocol must not conflict with existing laws to ensure smooth implementation and adherence by professionals. Last, all components of the protocol must be compatible with the local context including medical culture, physician–patient relationship, and religious and societal norms.

Because the demand for intensive care unit (ICU) beds exceeds the supply in general, and because of the formidable costs of that level of care, clinicians face ethical issues when rationing this kind of care not only at the point of admission to the ICU, but also after the fact. Under what conditions—if any—may patients be denied admission to the ICU or removed after admission? One professional medical group has defended a rule of “first come, first served” in ICU admissions, and this approach has numerous moral considerations in its favor. We show, however, that admission to the ICU is not in and of itself guaranteed; we also show that as a matter of principle, it can be morally permissible to remove certain patients from the ICU, contrary to the idea that because they were admitted first, they are entitled to stay indefinitely through the point of recovery, death, or voluntary withdrawal. What remains necessary to help guide these kinds of decisions is the articulation of clear standards for discontinuing intensive care, and the articulation of these standards in a way consistent with not only fiduciary and legal duties that attach to clinical care but also with democratic decision making processes.

Over the last decades, rationing of medical treatment in the National Health Service (NHS) has moved from implicit to being increasingly explicit about what is being denied and about the procedures and reasons for such decisions. This article argues that the courts have had an important role in this process. By applying a heightened scrutiny of rationing decisions, courts have forced health authorities to make better-informed decisions and to take procedural justice more seriously to comply with, respond to and avoid judicial review. The analysis in this article reveals that litigation has contributed to incremental, but significant and enduring, changes in a social policy. It also offers insights to the paradoxes of judicial accountability in health care policies.

Objectives: The aim of this study was to promote approaches to health technology assessment (HTA) that are both evidence-based and values-based. We conducted a systematic review of published studies describing formal methods to consider equity in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).

Methods: Candidate studies were identified through an unrestricted search of the Pub Med and EMBASE databases. The search closed on January 20, 2011. We identified additional studies by consulting experts and checking article bibliographies. Two authors independently reviewed each candidate study to determine inclusion and extracted data from studies retained for review. In addition to documenting methods, data extraction identified implicit and explicit notions of fairness. Data were synthesized in narrative form. Study quality was not assessed.

Results: Of the 695 candidate articles, 51 were retained for review. We identified three broad methods to facilitate quantitative consideration of equity concerns in economic evaluation: integration of distributional concerns through equity weights and social welfare functions, exploration of the opportunity costs of alternative policy options through mathematical programming, and multi-criteria decision analysis.

Conclusions: Several viable techniques to integrate equity concerns within CEA now exist, ranging from descriptive approaches to the quantitative methods studied in this review. Two obstacles at the normative level have impeded their use in decision making to date: the multiplicity of concepts and values discussed under the rubric of equity, and the lack of a widely accepted normative source on which to ground controversial value choices. Clarification of equity concepts and attention to procedural fairness may strengthen use of these techniques in HTA decision making.

Objectives: The UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has been widely hailed as an international leader in health technology assessment. The objectives of its guidance are to ensure uniformity in healthcare provision, and promote a systematic and accountable way to allocate resources. However, research relating to the implementation of guidance is limited, and little is known about how it influences decision making at the consultation level or how useful it is to individual patients.

Methods: In-depth interviews were undertaken with professionals involved in healthcare provision at the community level, and with clinical professionals and patients providing or receiving care for morbid obesity and breast cancer (n = 52).

Results: Although NICE guidance was generally well-regarded, in practice it was of more importance and usefulness to managerial than clinical professionals. Clinicians used a patchy approach to implementation depending on whether recommendations accorded with their personal interpretation of the evidence available, and whether funding was available locally. Many patients had not heard of NICE, and clinical professionals did not alert them to its existence. Even where patients knew about relevant guidance, they were rarely able to use it to assert their right to treatment.

Conclusions: These findings challenge the perception that NICE guidance results in consistent and accountable decision making, and the limited accessibility and usefulness of guidance to patients suggests more information and support is needed at the point of provision if these objectives are to be achieved.

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls demands from citizens who decide upon principles of justice and the rules derived from such principles that they abstract from all particularities that constitute their identity as unique individuals. This demand is unrealistic in policy settings where actual policy-makers convene to provide guidance, establish rules regarding public good, and enact legislation. In practice, I argue, policy-makers, legislators, and others involved in developing social rules that pertain to distributive justice formulate such rules as reasonably partial spectators. To illustrate, I show how clinical practice guidelines are established and mediated by a reasonably partial expert panel whose partial action is publicly justifiable, yet whose claims to impartiality are not.

Access to health care should be determined by clinical need and not by age. Older people form an increasing proportion of the general population and of those with coronary heart disease, but compared with younger people they are less likely to be invited for cardiac rehabilitation programmes and more likely not to complete them. This study examined the factors that contribute to these trends in Scotland. A national survey of rehabilitation centres (n = 30) found that the majority of their programme co-ordinators believe that age does influence access to rehabilitation. While only one programme used an overt age criterion, age was widely perceived to influence access, both during initial assessment and in assessments for exercise components; and while the respondents acknowledged that other criteria influenced selection, the factors cited most often were all more common during old age, e.g. the presence of other medical ailments, lower initial exercise tolerance, and poor access to private or public transport. Focus groups undertaken with a sub-sample of the co-ordinators revealed that staff appeared to have knowledge of the benefits of cardiac rehabilitation for older people, but that the scarcity of resources prevented them from offering more accessible and appropriate services.

Objectives: To investigate doctors' and nurses' attitudes toward 14 potential prioritization criteria.

Methods: This study was performed by using the random paired scenario method. The respondents received a questionnaire with 12 pairs of scenarios, imaginary patient cases, each of which contained two to three different prioritization criteria (e.g., child, old patient, poor patient). Respondents were asked which one of each scenario pair they would choose if only one patient could be treated. The scenarios were randomly put into 30 different questionnaire sets. There was a random selection of 241 doctors and 151 nurses in Finland, with response rates of 60.3% and 50.3%, respectively.

Results: Doctors prioritized young patients, severe disease, expensive treatments and posteriorized (negatively prioritized) demented or institutionalized patients, and patients having a self-caused disease. Children were strongly prioritized, even over serious diseases. Expensive treatments appeared to be favored by doctors, and this result cannot be explained by severity of disease. Nurses' attitudes were similar to those of doctors.

Conclusions: Children were strongly prioritized. Elderly persons were posteriorized if they had dementia or were living in institutions. Patients having a self-caused disease are posteriorized, more often by nurses than by doctors.