We consider stochastic replicator processes for games that are composed of finitely many trials. Several general results on the relation between Nash equilibria and the long-run behaviour of the stochastic processes are proved. In particular, a sufficient condition is given for almost sure convergence to a state where everyone plays in every trial a strict Nash equilibrium. The results are applied to multiple-trial conflicts based on wars of attrition and on sperm competition games with fair raffles, respectively.

“Recursive” games were first defined and studied by Everett. Related results can be found in Gillette, Milnor and Shapley, and Blackwell and Ferguson. In this paper we introduce the notion of a recursive matrix game, which we believe eliminates the vagueness but none of the useful generality of the earlier definition. We then give an inductive proof (different from the proof in [3]) that these games have a value, with ∊-optimal stationary strategies available to each player. We also apply the result and show how a class of games studied in a different framework are games of this type and thus have a value.