In response to Paul Hurley, I argue that Donald Davidson's triangulation argument can be applied to normative beliefs only if such beliefs are answerable to properties that are at once normative and causal. The argument thus commits Davidson to a non-reductive and strikingly non-revisionary form of naturalism. In response to Kirk Ludwig, I argue that Davidson had good reason to abandon Humean accounts of pro-attitudes because he had good reason to welcome the non-reductive and non-revisionary form of naturalism that comes into view once the triangulation argument is applied to normative beliefs.

In Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry, Robert H. Myers and Claudine Verheggen spell out, and extensively build on, the triangulation argument advanced by Donald Davidson. This paper is an introduction to a symposium devoted to their development of that argument. The symposium began in 2018 as an authors-meet-critics session at the Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress, and consists in the responses of three critics, Kirk Ludwig, Alexander Miller, and Paul Hurley, followed by Verheggen's and Myers's replies. I offer a brief sketch of each of the two parts of the book, and an overview of the questions raised by the critics.

This article raises two questions about Robert Myers and Claudine Verheggen's terrific book, Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry. The first question, concerning the first part of the book, is whether, starting from the assumption that a solitary individual cannot have thought contents, we can show that adding another individual to the picture cannot resolve the problem. The second question, concerning the second part, is whether a more sophisticated, decision-theoretic, Humean about the pro-attitudes can respond to the objections to the simple Humean view, and whether Davidson was not in fact just such a sophisticated decision-theoretic Humean.