Policy effectiveness is a critical measure for assessing whether policies are working and determining necessary adjustments. However, understanding the effectiveness of plastic policies is a significant gap in the toolkit driving solutions to the plastics crisis. This review examines effectiveness evaluations and existing tools for assessing policy effectiveness. The review further identifies the barriers to understanding effectiveness before proposing ways forward. Most studies focus on plastic bag bans or taxes, neglecting other policy instruments. Additionally, these studies often employ simple attribution approaches, rather than causal inference methods, limiting our ability to determine the true impact of policies on desired outcomes. The lack of monitoring and evaluation of plastic policies further hampers knowledge acquisition. The global understanding of the plastics economy and measurable success metrics is insufficient, hindering the design of systemic interventions. These findings highlight the development and evaluation of plastic policies with limited information. A more nuanced understanding of effective plastic policies is necessary, including a harmonised approach to evaluations, a shared definition of effectiveness, the use of rapid assessment tools and the integration of monitoring and evaluation into policy instruments.

A single solution to promote higher animal welfare across the whole EU is unlikely due to significant regional differences and because what is most appropriate for each region depends on many factors. Based on analyses of eight member and candidate EU countries, this paper provides a conceptual framework, an ‘animal welfare roadmap’, which can be used to assess the stage of maturity of a country in farm animal welfare policy development and identify appropriate policy instruments and indicators to monitor progress towards higher animal welfare. The ‘roadmap’ consists of five sequential stages: increasing compliance with legislation; raising awareness; product development; mainstreaming; and integration of animal welfare with other issues. For each stage, specific policy instruments are identified alongside the category of stakeholders most likely to be influential in the implementation of each instrument. The policy instruments used to achieve these stages are those used by government departments/agencies, private enterprises, academic bodies or non-governmental organisations who formulate standards for animal welfare. These are supported by indicators best suited to document their effectiveness. Although we have emphasised how different situations and contexts within the EU mean that there is no single optimal policy instrument for the EU as a whole, but rather appropriate policy instruments should be selected according to the stage of development of a country or sector, we do propose a harmonised choice of indicators to allow benchmarking of changes at the EU level with regard to progress towards animal welfare.

Studies of multi-level blame avoidance strategies generally assume that (1) governments prefer to shift responsibility to other levels and (2) an unclear distribution of formal responsibilities complicates blame allocation to a single actor. Considering the temporal location of such strategies – in anticipation or as a reaction to adverse events – the article tests these assumptions. Drawing on the case of air quality policy in Mexico City, the article uses causal process tracing to develop the mechanism leading to an anticipatory strategy and its unfolding. If the distribution of responsibilities on connected policy instruments is clear and major political actors share power, then government levels from different parties engage in a joint anticipatory strategy to avoid crisis and keep stability. The mechanism breakdown leads to reactive behaviour and policy change. Contextual changes redistributing power can destabilise the arrangements, leading to reactive blame games, fostering policy change.

Governments pursue their goals by adopting various mixes of policy instruments. This article proposes a specific operationalisation of these mixes and applies it to the analysis of reforms that many Western European governments have pursued, as they have adopted a similar policy design in their higher education systems (HESs) over the last 20 years. In fact, although these policies have similar templates, performance indicators exhibit remarkable variation between countries. Thus, by applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis to a large data set containing all changes in policy instruments undertaken in the last 20 years in 12 HESs in Western Europe, this article explores the possibility that differences in performance across national HESs could be associated – ceteris paribus – with different policy mixes. This article finds not only that the common template has been applied through very different national policy mixes but also that only a few instruments are regularly linked to good teaching performance, regardless of the other components of the actual policy mix.

In policymaking, actors are likely to take the preferences of others into account when strategically positioning themselves. However, there is a lack of research that conceives of policy preferences as an interdependent system. In order to analyse interdependencies, we link actors to their policy preferences in water protection, which results in an actor-instrument network. As actors exhibit multiple preferences, a complex two-mode network between actors and policies emerges. We analyse whether actors exhibit interdependent preference profiles given shared policy objectives or social interactions among them. By fitting an exponential random graph model to the actor-instrument network, we find considerable clustering, meaning that actors tend to exhibit preferences for multiple policy instruments in common. Actors tend to exhibit interdependent policy preferences when they are interconnected, that is, they collaborate with each other. By contrast, actors are less likely to share policy preferences when a conflict line divides them.

The institutional architecture of the European Union is based on two fundamentally competing ideas: supranational rule and national sovereignty. These two underlying ideas are not reconcilable and work at different levels in the background of the policy debate. While on the normative level public sentiments remain strongly linked to the idea of state autonomy, on the cognitive level the paradigm of a functional necessity to cooperate is decisive for actual policy making. Only in some policy domains, such as the single market program, have policy-makers attempted to re-couple normative and cognitive ideas. In contrast to this, the central argument is that policy-makers mostly adhere to an alternative strategy: the systematic decoupling of normative and cognitive ideas. Focusing on public administration, it is shown how deft policy instrumentation allows actors to realize program ideas that satisfy demands for increased supranational governance. At the same time, however, these instruments are in dissonance with how policies are framed against the background of public sentiments that assume domestic bureaucratic independence.

Numerous governments have adopted innovative policy instruments to deal with important environmental policy challenges and negotiated instruments offer the potential to improve performance beyond what regulation alone can accomplish. Dutch covenants, which represent negotiated agreements with sectors of industry as targets of behavioral change, provide useful evidence of the determinants of success. For improving environmental performance, certain features of the policy setting explain much of the variance in ambitions and outcomes: attitudes of decision makers in the affected businesses, attention to cost minimization, and possibly the degree of ambition built into the agreement. Modeling to explain the extent of ambition and compliance offer further insights. While some Dutch lessons may be restricted to more corporatist policy settings, others may help improve the effectiveness of negotiated agreements in many national settings.