With the publication of the Panama Papers in 2016, law firms and attorneys came under the spotlight of international anti-money laundering efforts. It became clear that attorneys, protected by the attorney-client privilege, play a significant role in concealing the origin of illicit funds and the constructing of offshore company-schemes. The public outcry prompted legislators to hold these facilitators accountable and to prevent money-laundering activities by imposing reporting obligation on them, whenever there is the suspicion of a client being involved in illicit activities. Unsurprisingly, attorney and professional associations voiced considerable opposition to these legislative efforts claiming an erosion of the attorney client privilege and nothing less than an attack on the rule of law. This article examines the attorney-client privilege from a historical, empirical, and constitutional perspective. A brief analysis of the legal frameworks in Germany and Switzerland exemplifies how reporting obligations affect legal practice and what challenges exist for attorneys. Both countries are considered global hubs for money laundering activities. The legal concepts of holding attorneys accountable in the neighboring countries differ in some respects. In conclusion, it shows that the legal professions successfully managed to widely avoid a ‘responsibilization’.

Money laundering is a serious crime that is often associated with organized crime, terrorism, and other illegal activities, often by transferring them through a series of financial transactions and institutions. In this study, the researchers focused on detecting a specific type of money laundering called “smurfing”, which involves breaking up large amounts of money into smaller transactions. The growing market for banking services and the intense competition among banks has led to a shift towards electronic banking. This shift is driven by changes in the way that customers use banking services and the advancements in technology. Electronic banking offers several benefits, such as faster transaction processing and the ability to avoid waiting in line at physical branches. However, it also carries risks, including the potential for electronic payment systems to be used for money laundering. With the development of technology, money laundering can now be done through online betting and casino platforms, as well as through the buying and selling of cryptocurrencies. This article aims to explore the ways in which electronic payment systems, online gambling, and cryptocurrencies can be used to launder illegally acquired money.

There is a broad political consensus that states must not facilitate money laundering, especially as relates to the proceeds of foreign grand corruption. Over the past 30 years, an elaborate regulatory regime has been put in place in most countries to ensure that proceeds of crime are interdicted and confiscated. It rests on the technically non-binding recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, an influential intergovernmental grouping. Despite this progress and the adoption of international treaties against corruption and organized crime, international law contains no express treaty rule that enjoins states from facilitating money laundering. Furthermore, there are formidable legal and practical obstacles to invoking international legal responsibility of states that do choose to benefit from enabling money laundering. This article explores the disconnect between international law as it stands and the widely accepted political imperative that states must not facilitate money laundering. It argues in favour of recognizing a self-standing customary rule to that effect, and outlines the content and likely impact of such a rule.

Money laundering repression and asset recovery are tools that share a very relevant preventive–general role. Both measures in Criminal Law seek to inhibit the monetary stimulus to commit offenses. The former does so by hampering the flow of earnings from illicit sources, and the latter by confiscating the earnings from their beneficiaries. These interlinked goals prove to be most useful from a criminal policy standpoint in the fight against organized crime since they are oriented to the economic disabling of their agents, blockading their financial movement and depriving them of the profits thus generated. This article explains the status of Paraguayan law and its application on these issues.

As regulated in Spanish law, money laundering requires a prior illicit activity that has generated the assets that are the subject of laundering. One of the subjects that has been deeply discussed in recent years by certain doctrinal sectors, even with support in various jurisprudential rulings, has been the suitability of crimes against the Public Treasury, especially tax fraud, as the prior offence underlying money laundering. Thus, it has been debated whether the tax offender carrying out one of the activities typified in the Criminal Code (acquiring, possessing, using, converting or transmitting assets) automatically commits a type of money laundering. In that case, it would become an automatic and inevitable consequence of the tax crime itself. If, on the contrary, some other component must be required (essentially through the subjective elements of the unjust) to determine the existence of a second crime, that of money laundering, the prohibition of non-bis in idem confronts us, to a greater or lesser extent. Furthermore, doctrinal approaches and some judgements of the Spanish highest courts have generated a reinterpretation of the criminal law that fits badly with the principles of criminality. Nor is it easy to delineate the assets that are the object of the tax offence that may be subject to laundering, since, by definition, they are assets that were originally in possession of the offending subject and, besides, they are pecuniary obligations. To that extent, the presumption of innocence could, in many cases, determine the exoneration of the suspect.

The present paper aims to provide a comprehensive yet critical overview of current Brazilian legislation on money-laundering prevention and control. Given that stripping criminals of their illegal profits has for a long time been considered one of the most important measures in the fight against international and organized crime, a part of this paper explores the legal mechanisms that allow for this to take place as a consequence of crime and, especially, in connection with money laundering in the context of the Brazilian criminal justice system.

This article analyzes the relationship between corruption offenses and money laundering with reference to the Spanish Penal Code. These two criminal categories lack a certain definition, as there is no such univocal concept of “political corruption” and “money laundering.” The reasons for the denaturation of these criminal figures will be addressed. Then, the paper will expose how these criminal figures relate to each other. We argue that a real concurrence between both figures is possible, although it may lead, in certain cases, to double incrimination and its consequent punitive excess. Therefore, we will propose some criteria for a restrictive interpretation of “money laundering” to avoid confusion with other legal figures such as “confiscation.” The paper will end with reference to the Spanish Criminal Code’s regulation on “confiscation” and a brief review of the main critics.

Civil forfeiture is an asset forfeiture mechanism available to seize proceeds of crime. Kenya has embraced its use and provides statutory mechanisms for its implementation. The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act is the main statute in this regard. This article examines the substantive law and procedure for civil forfeiture provided in this statute. The analysis indicates that the provisions are technical in nature and that the process is systematic. This ensures a procedurally and substantively fair process before an individual's property is seized. This approach aims to safeguard against the arbitrary deprivation of property. Nonetheless, challenges are identified that interfere with the effective implementation of the civil forfeiture regime. These problems lead to the current underutilization of the regime. Accordingly, the article identifies viable ways of addressing these shortcomings. Implementation of these suggestions could enhance the use and success of civil forfeiture in dealing with the proceeds of crime.

Following concerns that the art market is being used to launder criminal money and fund terrorist activities, measures have recently been introduced to subject the market to the anti-money laundering (AML) regime – such as the EU 5th Money Laundering Directive (2018) and the US Illicit Art and Antiquities Trafficking Prevention Bill (2018). The expansion of the AML regime to include art dealers has been attributed to the failure of regulation and the vulnerabilities inherent in the market to laundering. This paper considers vulnerabilities to money laundering and examines the types of regulation that apply in the art market. The paper then goes on to analyse the application of AML criminal law and preventive measures in the UK context, demonstrating that art dealers can be criminally prosecuted for engaging in normal commercial activities. Even if dealers do comply with AML reporting rules, such compliance can significantly impact upon their business. These are important considerations given the government's emphasis on striking a balance between the burdens on business and deterring money laundering activities. Drawing upon the AGILE analytical framework, we remain sceptical about the continued expansion of the AML regime.

Amy Bell examines the controversial Bribery Act which will come into effect on 1st July 2011 and why most businesses will have to prepare for it.

This article discusses the Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, which was issued by the Financial Action Task Force in June 2000. After a general overview of the problem of secrecy havens and of the criteria used to identify them, the article gives a critical assessment of the process used to arrive at the ‘black list’ of 15 jurisdictions that was eventually drawn up. In this respect, a comparison is made with the work carried out by the OECD in the field of unfair tax competition by tax havens. It also looks forward at the possible follow-up to this list, both by the FATF and other international fora.