This paper considers the history and nature of the ‘modern rule of releases’, concerning compromises to settle or preclude litigation. The rule holds that only matters the parties had contemplated as well as what they intended to release will in fact be released, even if the compromise has been made in the most general terms. Thus the rule is engaged when the releasor executes a general release but does not appreciate the existence of some of the claims the words used purport to release. This paper shows how the rule is a confusion of different conceptual bases and lines of authority and was created by accidentally muddling them together. It argues that, despite this, it successfully straddles both bases, functions well conceptually and serves a vital role.

This article argues that mistakes in written contracts should be corrected under the equitable doctrine of rectification rather than the common law of interpretation. But rectification on the basis of a common mistake should only be granted where both parties are actually mistaken. Any other approach is inconsistent with the nature of the equitable jurisdiction, and blurs the boundary between common mistake and unilateral mistake rectification.

When the Land Registration Act 2002 first came into force, the prevailing academic view was that it had created a system of “title by registration”, such that, where someone (B) is mistakenly registered as owner of another person's (A's) land, he acquires a good title (notwithstanding the mistake) that can validly be conveyed to someone else (C). The thesis of this article is that, whilst the logic of the “title by registration” principle might be conceptually attractive, it has proven to be unworkable in practice, is questionable as a matter of policy, and – looking to the future – ought to be abandoned in favour of a more subtle legislative scheme for resolving A-B-C disputes.

This paper explores the circumstances in which a change in the land register should be stigmatised as a mistake and thereby introduce the discretionary power to correct it. Recognising the importance of clarifying the concept of mistake, due to its role in controlling the reliability of the register, the paper reviews and rejects various possible determinants for mistake. It proposes an account of mistake which rests on a set of rigid legal constructs about entitlement and registration and which pays respect to various traditional attributes of property.