This article examines the rejection of the International Investor–State dispute (ISDS) system across the African continent and its replacement with a range of domestic and regional alternatives. It assesses the advantages of the two principal options for African countries: retaining the current ISDS system, or using local courts and regional tribunals. To this end, the dispute resolution mechanisms proposed in the Pan-African Investment Code, the 2016 Southern African Development Community Finance and Investment Protocol, the SADC model BIT, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Economic Community of West African States and East African Community investment agreements and domestic approaches are critically examined. The argument is then advanced that African countries should not abandon ISDS because replacing it with isolated domestic or regional mechanisms does not reduce any of the risks. In particular, for foreign investors, the risk associated with the adjudication of investment disputes in potentially biased, politically influenced domestic courts may prove too high. African host nations, in turn, risk sending out the wrong message concerning their commitment to the protection of foreign investments. Instead of veering off course, perhaps the time has come for African States to display the political will to remain within the ISDS system and contribute to its reform from within.

The 2016 Morocco–Nigeria bilateral investment treaty (BIT) stands out from other such treaties because of its innovative human rights approach to the protection and promotion of foreign direct investment. Human rights permeate its approach to the regulation of investment in a manner which is most unusual in international investment agreements (IIAs). As a result, this is the most socially-responsible BIT currently concluded. Although it remains exceptional within the investment-treaty framework, the treaty reflects African initiatives to ensure that the next generation of BITs encourages more responsible investments. As such, it shows that human rights-compliant investment treaties can find fertile ground in developing African countries and it sets an example for current and future negotiations aimed at fostering respect for human rights in investment activities.

This article utilizes the struggles for land rights associated to two sugar cane investments in Cambodia to reflect on the interactions between the multi-territoriality of supply chain capitalism and the multiplication of local spaces of legal intervention. With a combination of legal institutionalism, critical geography and value chains analysis, the article engages with value chains as the new space and form of the global system of production and looks at the theoretical and practical implications that derive from delocalization, outsourcing and the establishment of transnational networks that cut across boundaries and jurisdictions. After discussing the human rights impact of large-scale sugar production in the Koh-Kong region, the article introduces a critical legal chain approach to unpack and make visible the material and legal threads that connect Cambodia with multiple geographies around the world. In its last part, it utilizes the multi-territorial character of production to map its complexity and introduce the notion of ‘legal chokeholds’. These are legal structures and spaces of intervention that can be leveraged by human rights scholars, activists and other actors interested in re-defining the way in which rights, bargaining power and value are distributed through the chain of production. The violations and possible defence of the land rights that occurred in Cambodia are thus presented as output of non-linear interactions between legal and non-legal elements that operate at a distance, often unaware of each other.