In this chapter, we introduce the influential work of H. Paul Grice, focusing on his claims about indirectly communicated meaning. Grice is generally acknowledged as the first person to propose an account of how hearers derive implied meaning. He coined the now widely accepted term implicature to describe any proposition that is communicated without being directly stated, and he offered an account of how hearers derive implicatures by working out what a speaker meant to communicate beyond what has been directly and explicitly stated in an utterance. We begin this chapter by exploring Grice’s distinction between ‘what is said’ and what is implicated. We then move on to discuss his cooperative principle (CP) and its associated maxims. Speakers, it is claimed, abide by certain norms when they take part in a conversation. We outline Grice’s formulation of these norms, and the role they play in inferential processes and implicature derivation. The chapter closes with a discussion of the different categories of implicature that Grice identified. We look at examples to illustrate the role that context plays in inferential processes for each category of implicature.

The chapter addresses the relation between post-Gricean pragmatics and intercultural pragmatics. As such, it addresses meaning in relation to intentions and inferences and provides an overview of the main developments in this tradition, placing them in the context of the utility they have for understanding cross-cultural communication, and specifically the acquisition of pragmatic competence. Section 1.2 introduces the concept of pragmatic universals and moves to discussing how Grice’s account of cooperative conversational behavior can be viewed as such pragmatic universal principles. After pointing out some problems with Grice’s original account as it is seen from the perspective of several decades, Section 1.3 proceeds to post-Gricean approaches to linguistic communication, focusing not so much on the traditional debates concerning the number and scope of the necessary maxims or principles (covered briefly in Section 1.3.1) but rather on the semantics/pragmatic boundary and the related question of the truth-conditional content that opened up interesting contextualist pursuits (Section 1.3.2). Section 1.4 addresses different versions of contextualism and places them in the context of the debates between minimalists and contextualists. Section 1.5 concludes with comments on the utility of post-Gricean pragmatics for intercultural communication, stressing the significance of pragmatic universals.

In a seminal contribution, Paul Grice took what he called the ‘total signification of an utterance’ (i.e. the complete content someone communicates by a linguistic signal) and divided it in two, distinguishing between ‘what the speaker says’ versus ‘what the speaker implies’. However, recent developments have served to throw doubt on Grice’s taxonomy, with both sides of his divide coming under fire. I examine these challenges to Grice’s framework, but argue that they do not show that Grice’s notion of implicature is ill-founded, nor that his ’favoured sense’ of what is said is unnecessary. What they do serve to highlight is a peculiar tension in Grice’s original account. For it seems Grice merged two distinct features when defining what the speaker says versus what the speaker implicates: the idea of a content dictated by word meaning and structure alone, on the one hand, and the idea of an asserted or directly expressed proposition on the other. Yet once we resolve this tension it is possible to deliver an account of the total signification of an utterance which is both (fairly) faithful to Grice’s original account and which is able to do a great deal of explanatory work.

Semantic communication is about transmitting mental representations of reality. Three research questions address the nature of this process in primates. Can primates produce signals that are meaningful in a lexical sense? Are they capable of compositional semantics? Can they create and infer meaning by integrating context and intention? There is good evidence that, as recipients, primates have capacities at all three levels, whereas for signallers the evidence is less compelling. This difference may have cognitive roots, due to the fact that primate signallers are typically engaged in the here-and-now and, unlike humans, less able to refer to memory content. Future research will have to clarify what mental structures primates can take into account during communication, including entities that are not physically present.

In this chapter, I present the notion of an indirect speech act originatingin Searle's classic speech act theory and I discuss how other accounts inthe field of philosophy of language have revisited this notion.

Plausible deniability is a common feature of political discourse that allows speakers to avoid taking responsibility for a controversial utterance by invoking possible counter-interpretations. To engage in plausible deniability, Trump invokes seemingly reasonable evidence to contest or refute that he meant what he said, foregrounding only select elements of the meaning-making process while downplaying others. Trump’s use of plausible deniability allows him to rally his base while feigning innocence when confronted about controversial remarks. Although common to politics, Trumpian discourse pushes this language game to the limits of credulity through frequent acts of strategic denying that arouse both supporters and critics. This chapter analyzes the way Trump and his allies engage in plausible deniability through the examination of several high-profile cases, introducing the linguistic concept of “implicature” to shed light on the discursive moves and interpretive processes that underlie attempts to invoke plausible deniability. Key to deconstructing each of these examples is an anthropological understanding of the interactional context in which political remarks are spoken and understood.

The editors of the volume asked me to provide a broad overview of the beginnings of relevance theory back in the 1970s, how it has developed over the decades and where I see it moving in the future, reflecting in the process on the collective work that Deirdre Wilson and I initiated and that has been joined and considerably enriched by many others. Here are some personal notes to help address these questions.

The editors of the volume asked me to provide a broad overview of the beginnings of relevance theory back in the 1970s, how it has developed over the decades and where I see it moving in the future, reflecting in the process on the collective work that Deirdre Wilson and I initiated and that has been joined and considerably enriched by many others. Here are some personal notes to help address these questions.

This chapter introduces the context in which Grice presented his theory of implicatures, with special reference to speech act theory. It goes on to present Grice’s main contribution to pragmatics, detailing his principle of cooperation and presenting an overview of the different types of implicatures that he defined. Finally, the chapter presents a number of criticisms that have been levelled at his theory.

This chapter introduces the context in which Grice presented his theory of implicatures, with special reference to speech act theory. It goes on to present Grice’s main contribution to pragmatics, detailing his principle of cooperation and presenting an overview of the different types of implicatures that he defined. Finally, the chapter presents a number of criticisms that have been levelled at his theory.

This chapter focuses on the notion of particularized conversation implicatures. It starts by illustrating these implicatures with the case of metaphors, and shows the different ways in which Grice and relevance theory accounted for them. It goes on to argue that neither framework is equipped to explain why speakers use implicatures to communicate. The chapter presents a possible explanation for the existence of implicatures in terms of plausible deniability. Finally, the chapter introduces the notion of epistemic vigilance, a mechanism that hearers develop to avoid being deceived or manipulated.

This chapter focuses on the notion of particularized conversation implicatures. It starts by illustrating these implicatures with the case of metaphors, and shows the different ways in which Grice and relevance theory accounted for them. It goes on to argue that neither framework is equipped to explain why speakers use implicatures to communicate. The chapter presents a possible explanation for the existence of implicatures in terms of plausible deniability. Finally, the chapter introduces the notion of epistemic vigilance, a mechanism that hearers develop to avoid being deceived or manipulated.