In institutional design, public policy and for society as a whole, securing freedom of choice for individuals is important. But how much choice should we aim for? Various theorists argue that above some level more choice improves neither wellbeing nor autonomy. Worse still, psychology research seems to suggest that too much choice even makes us worse off. Such reasons suggest the Sufficiency View: increasing choice is only important up to some sufficiency level, a level that is not too far from the level enjoyed by well-off citizens in rich liberal countries today. I argue that we should reject the Sufficiency View and accept Liberal Optimism instead: expanding freedom of choice should remain an important priority even far beyond levels enjoyed in rich liberal countries today. I argue that none of the arguments given for the Sufficiency View work. Neither psychological evidence nor any broader social trends support it. If anything, they support Liberal Optimism instead. I also show why further increases are possible and desirable, and sketch some implications for debates around immigration, economic growth, markets and the value of community.

Nudge advocates contend that nudges are liberty preserving, while government regulations are not. We interrogate that assumption by considering negative liberty in the forms suggested by the proponents of nudges. Specifically, we examine three ways of measuring negative liberty – liberty as freedom of choice, liberty as absence of coercion and liberty as absence of interference – applying the measures to a case study relevant to the nudge literature: regulations governing healthy food manufacture. We show that, depending on the liberty measure adopted and the estimated impact on producer and consumer behaviour, some regulations can be liberty reducing, while others are liberty preserving or liberty enhancing. When it comes to comparing nudges and more traditional policies aimed at increasing the health and welfare of citizens, there is no a priori negative liberty ground for preferring nudges.

This article analyses the inherent conflict between public and private interest from a long time-perspective, using the example of Sweden from 1620 to 2000. The main argument is that there have been two equally decisive historical shifts in the political discourse on how to organize public services in the past: First, a shift from an early modern patriarchal discourse to a more expansive articulation of publicness during the nineteenth century. Second, a shift toward privatization and deregulation in the late twentieth century. Both these shifts must be considered to fully explain the changing forms of public organization up to the present day. Theoretically, the concept of “publicness” is used to explain the political discourses on the organization of public services. Drawing on three discursive chains, the argument is that the political development was affected by the politicians’ conception of the political community, the form of organization, and by perceptions of values such as equal access and modernity. Our results demonstrate how and why political arguments for or against private service providers have motivated profound changes in the way public services are perceived of and organized.

Although Wang Chong has often been categorized as a kind of fatalist, many scholars maintain that his fatalism does not include one's moral autonomy, as he argues that one's inborn moral tendencies can be changed through education. He even acknowledges that a person can live a different life from what one's ming must have dictated. But in this article, I show that even when Wang seems to claim that personal effort is important in life, he soon claims that even the abilities to make efforts or to strive to be a better person are more or less decided at birth. And even when he claims that people born with evil nature can be guided to goodness, nowhere does he suggest that to be good or evil is a matter of our choice. And if there is an occasion where one does not live up to what one's ming has predetermined, it is only because there was another ming, one that is more powerful than that of an individual, that interfered with the realization of one's original ming, not because that one's original ming has changed. In the end, I argue that even though Wang Chong may not be a fatalist in its fullest sense, since fatalism means that every event is necessitated, he comes very close to being one, as he sees that in so many instances of our lives, we are not free to act in any other way than in the way that ming has prearranged.

Sweden has in the last 20 years undergone an extensive process of marketisation of its home care sector. Where the public sector once was the only provider of home care services, there is now a wide array of different, private alternatives for older people to choose from, using their publicly funded voucher. The publicly funded home care services in Sweden are, in other words, to a large extent organised according to the principles of a quasi-market. Older people with care needs are therefore now considered to be consumers of home care since they are expected to make an informed choice of home care provider according to their own preferences. This paper studies the extent to which older people with care needs assume this role and how they do it, using Hirschman's well-known theory on ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ and theory on the difference between care and market logic. The study is based on results from a research project using telephone interviews to ask a large number of older people in three Swedish cities about their experience of making this choice. The results show that they had difficulty understanding how to choose and what the purpose of the choice was. The conclusion of this study suggests some possible reasons why policy makers in Sweden continue to favour the freedom-of-choice model in spite of these poor results.