In this chapter, I argue for a contextualist approach to epistemic norms for practical reasoning, according to which the degree of justification required for it to be permissible to treat p as a reason for action varies with context. In section 3.1, I introduce how these proposals are motivated and three questions that will shape the following discussion. In sections 3.2 to 3.4, I discuss the proposals of Brown, Gerken, and Locke in turn. The most pressing issue for current contextualist accounts is what I call the incompleteness problem, which is how context determines what degree of justification a context calls for. In section 3.5, I develop a solution to the incompleteness problem that involves a comparison of two opposing costs, the costs of error and the costs of further inquiry. Finally, I point out a context-invariant principle that will become significant in Chapter 5.

In this chapter, I argue for epistemic encroachment, the thesis that, in an important sense, practical rationality depends on epistemic rationality. I argue for this thesis by engaging with several challenges to it. The first one is due to Derek Parfit, who questions that, generally, epistemic failings translate into a failure of practical rationality. Sections 1.1 to 1.4 concern this general challenge to epistemic encroachment on practical rationality. In section 1.5, I argue that we can infer from epistemic encroachment that there is an epistemic norm on practical reasoning. In section 1.6 and 1.7, I turn to the second challenge due to Davide Fassio, who tries to resist a specific form of epistemic encroachment, namely, that there is a genuine epistemic norm for practical reasoning.

Epistemic norms for practical reasoning usually concern the question which epistemic condition must be met for it to be rationally permissible to treat p as a reason for action. I call this the classical question. In this chapter, I broaden the debate about epistemic norms, going beyond the classical question by focusing on ends. In section 2.1, I argue that we can approach the question of which ends one can rationally pursue by answering the question what one may hope for. In section 2.2, I argue that the standard condition on rational hope is too weak to properly constrain what one can rationally hope for. In section 2.3, I give my own account of what one may epistemically hope for, to which knowledge is central. In section 2.4, I point out that this suggests a novel angle on the knowledge-first program. In section 2.5, I relate my account of hope back to pursuing ends. Finally, in section 2.6, I argue that the wide variety of ends one can rationally pursue shows that many of the suggested epistemic norms that concern the classical question are overly demanding.