Chapter 2 - Practical Reasoning, Ends, and the End of Hope

Summary

Epistemic norms for practical reasoning usually concern the question which epistemic condition must be met for it to be rationally permissible to treat p as a reason for action. I call this the classical question. In this chapter, I broaden the debate about epistemic norms, going beyond the classical question by focusing on ends. In section 2.1, I argue that we can approach the question of which ends one can rationally pursue by answering the question what one may hope for. In section 2.2, I argue that the standard condition on rational hope is too weak to properly constrain what one can rationally hope for. In section 2.3, I give my own account of what one may epistemically hope for, to which knowledge is central. In section 2.4, I point out that this suggests a novel angle on the knowledge-first program. In section 2.5, I relate my account of hope back to pursuing ends. Finally, in section 2.6, I argue that the wide variety of ends one can rationally pursue shows that many of the suggested epistemic norms that concern the classical question are overly demanding.