Chapter Two summarizes the compliance literature on international relations and international law, addressing both theoretical and empirical work. This literature can be divided into two groups: The first group explores why states comply with international law and is generally associated with the primary schools of international relations theory. The study may confirm or illustrate the applicability of aspects of one or more of these theories, although that is not necessary for it to be valuable in illuminating the motivations that affect policymakers and states. The second group within the compliance literature examines more closely how states comply at the domestic level and focuses on domestic policymaking within the United States government. In this regard, the chapter concentrates on two similar normative and process-oriented approaches. The first, the international legal process approach, is drawn from international legal scholarship; the second is primarily drawn from constructivist international relations theory, and was developed primarily by Wayne Sandholtz and Christopher Whytock, among others. Both approaches emphasize the role of internalized norms and the importance of process and organizational structure in decision-making. They are, accordingly, helpful in understanding the effect of legal norms, lawyers, and process in State Department decision-making.

Although states of most types receive distinct advantages when they formalize their cooperation through public, legally binding agreements, we argue that absolute monarchs are uniquely able to capture personal benefits from secret, cartel-like cooperation. Domestic decision-making in absolute monarchies is unchecked, nontransparent, and highly personal, and these norms reproduce themselves at the international level when absolute monarchs cooperate with each other. We assess the explanatory strength of our theory through two in-depth case studies. First, we examine how the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian monarchs used informal agreements strategically during the Concert of Europe to suppress domestic unrest. Second, we explore how the Iraqi, Jordanian, and Saudi monarchs used secret agreements to counter domestic pro-republican sentiment in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Irrespective of geography, religion, and time period, the nontransparent and unilateral manner with which absolute monarchs implement domestic policies facilitates and encourages this type of informal cooperation.