In this text, of which we have translated a large excerpt, Olivi defends his own version of the identity theory of the soul and its powers. On this version, the soul is a bundle of powers (plus spiritual matter), and so is identical to the entire collection of its powers (plus spiritual matter). To defend this view, Olivi first considers and rejects another version of the identity theory, on which the soul is a single power capable of eliciting all of the different vital acts associated with a living being. His main argument against this position is that diverse forms of production or of activity require powers that are themselves diverse by nature or essence. Olivi then attacks the distinction theory developed, for instance, by Aquinas, arguing that, among other things, this theory conflicts with our conception of ourselves as essentially free and rational agents. Next, Olivi criticizes Bonaventure’s distinction theory, arguing that it is impossible for the soul’s powers to be substances and yet dependent on the soul itself. Finally, Olivi puts forward his own preferred bundle theory of the soul and its powers.

In this text, Albert deals with Augustine’s theory of the image of the Trinity. An examination of this theory leads him to an investigation of the relation between the soul and its powers. Albert contends that the soul and its powers are distinct. He maintains that the soul’s powers are propria, that is, necessary accidents, and following Avicenna he claims that they “flow” from the essence of the soul. In this text, Albert also considers the identity theory, on which the soul and its powers are the same entity but rejects it because it “borders on heresy”. He argues that the identification of the soul and its powers is perilously close to the identification of essence and power in God. Finally, Albert invokes the Boethian notion of a “power-whole” (totum potentiale) to develop his own account of the soul and its powers and to make sense of the Augustinian claim that our rational soul is an image of the Trinity. Albert was one of the main defenders of the distinction theory in the second half of the thirteenth century, and his version of this theory influenced Aquinas.