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7. - Peter of John Olivi (d. 1298), Questions on the Sentences, book II, q. 54 (excerpts):

Are the Soul’s Powers Totally the Same as Their Substance and as Each Other, Totally Diverse, or Partially the Same and Partially Diverse?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 April 2025

Russell L. Friedman
Affiliation:
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
Can Laurens Löwe
Affiliation:
Saint Louis University
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Summary

In this text, of which we have translated a large excerpt, Olivi defends his own version of the identity theory of the soul and its powers. On this version, the soul is a bundle of powers (plus spiritual matter), and so is identical to the entire collection of its powers (plus spiritual matter). To defend this view, Olivi first considers and rejects another version of the identity theory, on which the soul is a single power capable of eliciting all of the different vital acts associated with a living being. His main argument against this position is that diverse forms of production or of activity require powers that are themselves diverse by nature or essence. Olivi then attacks the distinction theory developed, for instance, by Aquinas, arguing that, among other things, this theory conflicts with our conception of ourselves as essentially free and rational agents. Next, Olivi criticizes Bonaventure’s distinction theory, arguing that it is impossible for the soul’s powers to be substances and yet dependent on the soul itself. Finally, Olivi puts forward his own preferred bundle theory of the soul and its powers.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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