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3 results

  • Unfair commercial practices in a pit market: evidence from an artefactual field experiment

  • Francesco Bogliacino, Rafael Charris, Cristiano Codagnone, Frans Folkvord, Felipe Montealegre, Francisco Lupiáñez-Villanueva
  • Journal:
    Behavioural Public Policy , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    03 October 2022, pp. 1-18
    • Article
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  • Commercial practices such as drip pricing, reference pricing and best-price guarantee can be used to set higher prices and mislead consumers, but protective measures can restore efficiency. In a placebo-controlled market experiment, we examined a treatment allowing for the use and misuse of commercial practices. Three additional treatments tested the effects of formal sanctions, informal sanctions and a regret nudge. We found that commercial practices led to higher prices, cheating was systematic and regret nudging was ineffective. Furthermore, formal and informal sanctions reduced both the likelihood of using commercial practices and the likelihood of cheating, leading to welfare increases.

  • 9 - Blockchains

  • from Part III - Electronic Platforms and Networks
  • Edited by Larry A. DiMatteo, Michel Cannarsa, Cristina Poncibò
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms
    Published online:
    25 October 2019
    Print publication:
    10 October 2019, pp 160-182

  • Summary

    This chapter seeks to discredit the popular belief that blockchains will revolutionize or disrupt commerce. More specifically, it aims to clarify that blockchains as such cannot serve as a technology or ideology for the decentralization of online marketplaces. To this end, the chapter examines the interrelated concepts of decentralization, disintermediation, trustlessness, and immutability. It is necessary to understand what those terms actually mean and how they affect actual, commercial practices. The chapter commences with a broad description of blockchains and introduces the important division between public and private blockchains, to demonstrate that only the latter could potentially serve as a technology that could provide a user-friendly and secure transacting environment. It confronts the practical implications of decentralization, focusing on the fact that the absence of formalized control usually translates into an absence of formalized governance processes.