The distinct operational characteristics of military aircraft, relative to civil aircraft, have impeded the standardisation of airworthiness management practice across Europe. Standardisation has been further deterred by the intertwined certification and qualification activities specific to military aircraft. The management of airworthiness in European military aviation has undergone significant changes over the past 15 years, with the progress made attributed to the harmonisation efforts driven by the European Defence Agency (EDA). The creation of a Military Airworthiness Authorities Forum and the development of the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR) have been instrumental in creating a more homogenous regulatory landscape. The examples of five main players of the European aerospace sector, namely France, Italy, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, are examined from the point of view of adoption and implementation of an EMARs-based system. Their regulatory structures have revealed similarities and primary differences. The EMAR’s framework has enabled a gradual build-up of technical knowhow within the European countries who embraced this, civil-based, framework. All five countries have adopted EMARs, though through a variety of regulatory constructs. Their regulatory structures exhibit diverse practices, especially in how initial and continuing airworthiness is managed. Some countries have also elected to have more than one authority overseeing/been responsible for airworthiness. Closer collaboration between national Military Aviation Authorities (MAAs) can be achieved through standardisation at regulatory structure level. The establishment of a joint MAAs may be the next logical step in the harmonisation process, in line with EDA objective’ for a EU-wide authority with greater powers.

A novel statistical model is presented to quantify situation awareness in the operation of small civilian Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Today, the vast majority of small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operation takes place under Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) of a human operator, who is wholly responsible for the safety of the flight. As operation begins to move to Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS), it is likely that this responsibility will become shared between operator and the increasingly autonomous UAS itself. Before we seek to quantify the safety of such a system, it is beneficial to analyse the safety of existing Visual Line of Sight (VLOS) operations to provide a target level of safety. Prior to considering any on-board decision making, it is essential to ensure that the artificial situation awareness system of a UAS in Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) is at least as good as awareness of a human operator. The paper provides a probabilistic theory and model for the high-level abstractions of situation awareness to guide future assessment of BVLOS operations.

The ever-changing battlefield environment, as well as the emergence of global command and control architectures currently used by armed forces around the globe, requires the use of robust and adaptive technologies integrated into a reliable platform. Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) aim to integrate such advanced technologies while also increasing the tactical capabilities of combat aircraft. This paper provides a summary of the technical and operational design challenges specific to UCAVs, focusing on high-performance, and stealth designs. After a brief historical overview, the main technology demonstrator programmes currently under development are presented. The key technologies affecting UCAV design are identified and discussed. Finally, this paper briefly presents the main issues related to airworthiness, navigation, and ethical concerns behind UAV/UCAV operations.