The fourteen years of Tory rule constitute a stunning missed opportunity to seize on one of Britain’s few internationally renowned assets – its creativity. The government did step in to save organisations from disaster during the pandemic; it did, early on, extend its successful system of tax credits from film and TV to other cultural forms. It did the beat drum for extending demographic opportunities, even if in its actions it did not follow through. What mattered at least as much as specific decisions in this latest Tory era, particularly the latter part under May, Johnson, Truss and Sunak, was the manner of government engagement. Many in the sector are demoralised, having to raise private funds while being disparaged by ministers.

This chapter considers non-EU nationals. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides common policies on borders, immigration and international protection, albeit that there are special regimes for Denmark and Ireland. The Schengen Borders Code governs the treatment of non-EU nationals at external borders. However, it is supplanted for many non-EU nationals by out-of-area border controls such as visa policy, carrier liability regimes and interception of non-EU nationals out at sea. Immigration policy requires States to deport non-EU nationals who are irregularly present in the Union unless there are strong compassionate grounds. EU law grants significant social rights to two types of non-EU national and their families: the worker resident and the long-term resident. Those seeking international protection can make only one application in the EU, which, usually, has to be in the State where they first enter the EU. They have a right to remain within the State pending consideration of their application. During this time, they must be provided with housing, food, healthcare and education for minors. These benefits are sparse and contingent on the applicant complying with reporting and accommodation requirements.

The four chapters in Part I examine the assumptions, regulations, exceptions, compromises, and workarounds that shaped whether and how Soviet visitors made it into the United States. They address the overarching questions of why, despite deep mutual suspicions that persisted even after the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1933, Soviet citizens came to the United States and why the US government let them come.

Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of Global Migrations presents an authoritative overview of the various continuities and changes in migration and globalization from the 1800s to the present day. Despite revolutionary changes in communication technologies, the growing accessibility of long-distance travel, and globalization across major economies, the rise of nation-states empowered immigration regulation and bureaucratic capacities for enforcement that curtailed migration. One major theme worldwide across the post-1800 centuries was the differentiation between “skilled” and “unskilled” workers, often considered through a racialized lens; it emerged as the primary divide between greater rights of immigration and citizenship for the former, and confinement to temporary or unauthorized migrant status for the latter. Through thirty-one chapters, this volume further evaluates the long global history of migration; and it shows that despite the increased disciplinary systems, the primacy of migration remains and continues to shape political, economic, and social landscapes around the world.

It is no secret that migrant destination countries have become increasingly interested in regulating migrant inflows. We discuss in this chapter some potential tools of migration management suggested by other scholars – notably, border restrictions and fortification, foreign aid, and bilateral trade agreements. We turn the conversation toward a different area of policy: labor market access. We argue that migrant-receiving countries interested in regulating migration can do so by creating temporary labor market access for people from sending countries. Allowing some migrants formal employment opportunities significantly increases the amount of remittances they send home, a financial resource that family members can use to finance their immobility rather than sending additional family members abroad. We use an array of data and empirical specifications to make the case that labor market access increases remittances, and that this increase in remittances reduces subsequent authorized and unauthorized migration to the United States. Our findings suggest that countries interested in managing migration pressures have an incentive to open up more temporary pathways to the formal labor market for migrants.

A substantial industry has pushed forward the market for multiple citizenships. Drawing on extensive empirical research, this chapter investigates investment migration programs in practice by analyzing their constitution and evolution within a global market. This chapter identifies the underlying dynamics of supply and demand, rethinking the literature on citizenship in three areas: inter-country differences in citizenship’s benefits, privileged access for elites, and the decisive influence of third-party actors on citizenship policy. Within this theoretical landscape, the empirical analysis unpacks how these programs emerged within a broader field constituted by immigrant investor visas and discretionary economic citizenship. It reveals how this field conditioned the development and spread of formal programs, and the roles of geopolitical inequalities, industry actors, and extraterritorial rights in this change. The conclusion shows how incorporating jus pecuniae into our understanding of citizenship revises conventional assumptions in two domains: inequality and third-party actors.