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The period between July and December 1940 is usually characterised in terms of Vichy’s attempts to develop closer relations with Berlin which culminated in a new policy of collaboration. However, this picture obscures a second dimension to Vichy’s policy that saw Pierre Laval and Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin engage in concerted efforts at rapprochement with Rome to counter the domination of Berlin. Their efforts foundered upon Mussolini’s ideologically driven opposition, but their persistence suggests that it was not inevitable that French collaboration should have become exclusively directed towards Germany. At the same time, however, Vichy had two main concerns about Italian intentions. The first was that Italy’s encroachments upon French sovereignty in its occupation zone might lead to territorial annexation by stealth. The second was the need to protect the French colonial empire from Fascist claims, especially over Tunisia. Vichy, therefore, attempted to use collaboration with Germany to counter the threat from Italy.
This chapter provides an outline of the book’s central argument, explaining the different dimensions of Vichy’s double bind and situating it within the context of the scholarship on the Vichy French government, Italian Fascist foreign policy, French collaboration and the occupation of France during the Second World War.
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