This chapter outlines the advantages and limitations of both third-party and first-party reporting requirements. We begin by evaluating the Biden Administration’s 2021 bank information reporting proposal as an example of a third-party information reporting reform. Then, we provide a model for introducing first-party information reporting from high-end taxpayers regarding their finances through an annual wealth reporting form, which we call the Annual Net Asset Statement. Next, we introduce a hybrid system that incorporates both first- and third-party information reporting and explain how this system would have offered an alternative approach to the Biden Administration’s proposal for reporting inflows and outflows from financial accounts. Finally, we describe how this framework can help improve the tailoring of penalties for noncompliance in two areas: with information-reporting obligations, and in the use of audit resources. We explain how a means-adjusted approach can improve the operation of these information-reporting rules and complement the activity-based focus in current law.

This chapter addresses the weaknesses of tax penalties in current law as deterrents of high-end tax noncompliance and describes how Congress could introduce tax penalties that vary depending upon taxpayers’ means. The chapter begins with a discussion of the possible motivations for individual tax compliance, including potential adverse consequences of noncompliance and, specifically, civil tax penalties. It then considers why current civil tax penalties often fail to deter high-end tax noncompliance. Finally, the chapter presents means-adjusted tax penalties as a new approach to the design of civil tax penalties, illustrates this approach with several examples, and addresses additional concerns.

This chapter addresses the role of tax advice in encouraging aggressive and abusive tax planning by high-end taxpayers. It begins with a discussion of the different roles of tax advice, one of which is its use as a form of tax penalty insurance. The chapter then shows how the rich benefit disproportionately from the ability to avoid penalties through tax advice. After describing these effects, we offer a proposal for incorporating means adjustments into the tax penalty defense rules, focusing specifically on tax advice, and we respond to potential objections and concerns.

This chapter turns to the structure of the tax compliance system and how it attempts to address high-end noncompliance. It begins by situating the tax compliance rules within the broader tax system. The discussion considers what they share with all tax rules and what sets them apart. The following sections begin a more detailed dive into the structure of the tax compliance system. After addressing what motivates taxpayers to comply with the tax law, the discussion considers the main components of the tax compliance system, and how these components leverage taxpayer motivations to improve compliance. With this important context on the tax compliance system established, the discussion then returns to the challenges of high-end noncompliance. The final part of this chapter describes the two most prominent approaches in current law and reform proposals. The first general approach is to increase funding of the Internal Revenue Service so it can more effectively deter noncompliance and recover unpaid taxes. The second general approach is what this book terms “activity-based” rules, targeting the specific taxpayer activities that can either indicate or enable tax noncompliance.