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This chapter engages the work of two prominent theorists of agonistic democracy, William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe. It analyzes their critiques of liberal theory and Western political thought, both of which, they argue, divest politics of its essential vitality by prizing consensus, unity, and agreement. Commending agonism for its recovery of the ineliminable place of contestation in democratic politics, as well as its appreciation of the generative and emancipatory possibilities of conflict, the chapter then raises the question of political community. Must agonism’s safeguarding of difference and its preservation of perpetual contestation entail the abandonment of the concept of community? I argue agonists are right to worry about the ways appeals to community threaten difference, but contend nevertheless that a vision of collectivity is necessary for agonistic politics to survive the pressures of neoliberalism. The chapter concludes by considering a movement of radical theology that has adopted some of agonism’s central insights but which, I argue, remains captive to a form of analogical thinking that insufficiently attends to the nature of creaturehood.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous Western missionaries were involved in debating the existence of God in various religious texts and practices in ancient China. Drawing on both the rising philological scholarship in Europe and their own field experience in China, the Western missionaries examined the idea of God, the Thearch, and Heaven as the Supreme Being in the spiritual life and ritual activities of the Chinese people. From the Christian perspective, they attempted to identify the original belief in one God in ancient China in order to convert their Chinese audience. Furthermore, they addressed the issue of monotheism in the broader Asian context by suggesting the universal monotheistic degeneration from Persia to China across Asia continent.
In this book, David Michael Grossberg offers a fresh and illuminating perspective on the three-thousand-year evolution of Jewish monotheism by narrating the history of 'God is one' as a religious slogan from the ancient to the modern world. Although 'God is one' has been called Judaism's primary testimony of faith, its meaning has been obscure and contentious from its earliest emergence. From the Bible's acclamatory 'the Lord is one' to Philo of Alexandria's highest Word just secondary to God; from the Talmud's rejection of 'two powers in heaven' to the philosophers' First Existent who is one beyond unity; from the Kabbalists' tenfold Godhead to Spinoza's one substance, this innovative history demonstrates the remarkable diversity encompassed by this deceptively simple Jewish statement of faith. Grossberg shows how this diversity is unified in a continuous striving for knowledge of God that has been at the heart of Judaism from its earliest beginnings.
Monotheism, belief in only one God, and wisdom, learning to cope by reason alone and teaching others to do so, faced resistance in the polytheistic world of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, and lesser states including Israel. Paradoxically, in early biblical wisdom (Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes) the deity was thought to be both human-like, with disturbing attributes, and increasingly transcendent-silent, disembodied, and inactive. Like Egyptian Ma'at, God the creator established the universe by decree, a law rewarding goodness and punishing evil, the flaw in creation, never satisfactorily resolved. Satan, a semi-divine rival, bore responsibility for bad things, while Wisdom, a personified female, communicated God's will to the discerning. Combining biblical revelation and Hellenism, Sirach and Wisdom of Solomon chose piety over Job's realism and the vanity literature of Ecclesiastes. Over millennia, the concept of God evolved, continuing a process begun in Paleolithic times.
This Element explores the relationship between monotheism and relativism. Over the last two decades, emerging relativist theories have been extensively developed and debated within the fields of philosophy. How does monotheistic theology relate to relativism, especially to relativism about truth? Given that truth relativism contends that beliefs and propositions are invariably only relatively true, it appears to conflict with traditional monotheism, which asserts the absolute truth of God's existence. This book examines the compatibility of relativist positions with monotheism, emphasising the need to differentiate among the diverse forms, types, and domains of relativism. It presents a nuanced stance on the relationship between relativism and monotheism.
This Element addresses the opportunities and constraints operating on monotheistic peacebuilding, focusing on the three Abrahamic faiths, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, which share a common origin. These opportunities and constraints are approached through what the volume calls 'the paradox of monotheism'. Monotheism is defined by belief in one omnipotent, benign, and loving God, but this God does not or cannot prevent violence, war, and conflict. Moreover, monotheism can actually promote conflict between the Abrahamic faiths, and with other world religions, giving us the puzzle of holy wars fought in God's name. The first section of the Element outlines the paradox of monotheism and its implications for monotheistic peacebuilding; the second section addresses the peacebuilding efforts of three Abrahamic monotheistic religions and the constraints that operate as a result of the paradox of monotheism. This paradox tends to limit monotheistic peacebuilding to inter-faith dialogue, which often does not go far enough.
Monotheism implies a God who is active in creation. An author writing a novel provides a better analogy for God's creative activity than an artificer constructing a mechanism. A miracle is then not an interruption of the ordinary course of nature so much as a divine decision to do something out of the ordinary, and miracle is primarily a narrative category. We perceive as miracles events that are extraordinary while also fitting our understanding of divine purpose. Many miracle accounts may remain problematic, however, since recognizing that a given story purports to narrate a miracle does not determine whether the miracle occurred. This Elementweighs competing narratives. In doing so the understanding of the normal workings of nature will carry considerable weight. Nevertheless, there can be instances where believers may, from their own faith perspective, be justified in concluding that a miracle has occurred.
While angels have played a decisive role in all the world's major religions and continue to loom large in the popular religious and creative imagination, modern theology has tended to ignore or trivialize them. The comparatively few scholarly works on angels over the last century have typically interpreted them as mere symbols and metaphors: they are said to offer glimpses not of the divine order, but of human desires, anxieties, and ideologies. Angelology has collapsed into anthropology. By contrast, this polemical book argues for the indispensable importance of studying angels as divinely created beings, for theology at large, and for understanding the defining doctrine of monotheistic religions in particular. Additionally, the book contends that the spirit of modern science did not originate with the so-called Scientific Revolution but was actually inspired centuries earlier by the angelological lucubrations of medieval scholastics.
Monotheism, the belief in the One True God, seems to have an ambiguous role in political life: On the one hand, monotheism may foster the inclusion of everybody, regardless of identity or background. On the other, monotheistic religions demand submission to a singular revealed truth, distinguish between faithful and the heretics, and thus seemingly promote an antagonistic and tribalistic politics. What, then, are the political implications of the monotheistic belief in absolute truth? This Element traces the Enlightenment origins of our contemporary debates about monotheism and argues that these debates reflect a deeper Western ambivalence towards religion. It does so while discussing both secular and Christian critics of the politics of monotheism. The Element contends that there is no singular politics of monotheism, and that we can only approach monotheism's political significance if we take seriously the various ways in which truth is represented in political life in monotheistic traditions.
This book offers a selective, typological overview of Jewish perspectives on the belief in God's oneness. To achieve this, the author divides the history of Judaism into four phases - biblical, rabbinic, medieval, and modern - and presents diverse models for understanding the reality of divine oneness within each phase. These models not only offers insight into different perspectives on the topic but also illuminate diverse layers of polemical discourse in the Jewish tradition, whether internal or in dialogue with other religions and worldviews. In addition, the author invites readers to consider how to think about the plurality of the perspectives at hand, and if and how such meta-reflection can enrich the lives of contemporary readers, Jewish and non-Jewish alike. No prior knowledge of Judaism is necessary.
In the monotheistic traditions, there are people who report having special experiences that justify their monotheistic beliefs. They see, hear, or otherwise experience directly the one true God, ruler of the universe. In order to understand what is going on in these experiences and how we should respond to reports of these experiences, it is important to understand what religious experiences can and can't be, what the claim of monotheism entails, and therefore how what reports of such experiences mean, both for the experiencer and for the recipient of the report.
Like religious leaders in any period, the prophets functioned within a religious world that was broader and more diverse than a surface reading might suggest. In “The Book of Isaiah in the History of Israelite Religion,” Christopher B. Hays analyzes various religiohistorical aspects of the book, such as the role of writing and symbolic action; the supernatural images of the divine throne room; the book’s role in developing ideas about death and afterlife; its central role in the formulation of biblical monotheism, including its polemics against idols; and its relationship to the Jerusalem Temple and its priests.
Chapter 1 explains the theoretical framework deployed throughout the book, largely drawn from the companion volume, Unearthly Powers. Above all, this means explaining the two forms of religiosity – immanentism and transcendentalism – and how they related to each other. While immanentism is a default or universal strand of human life, transcendentalism defines what is distinctive about the religions of salvation that emerged from the Axial Age of the first millennium BCE. These world religions also contained an immanentist element, however, even as they produced reform movements that insisted on the transcendentalist dimension. These modes also gave rise to two different means by which rulers could be sacralised: divinised kingship (immanentism) and righteous kingship (transcendentalism). The chapter then fleshes out a tripartite model for ruler conversion: (1) religious diplomacy often first induced rulers to favour foreign missionaries; (2) immanent power, or supernatural assistance in this life, tended to be crucial in convincing them to make a change of allegiance, and (3) the Christianisation of their realms was linked to its capacity to enhance their authority. Lastly, the themes of cultural glamour and intellectual appeal are introduced.
Great changes have taken place in the approach of historians to the topic since the publication of East of Byzantium (1980). Instead of centre-periphery or top-down models they now see the relations between Byzantium and the east in terms of connectivity, networks and horizontal ties. This is connected with the spread of late antiquity as a concept and includes a great expansion in Syriac studies. Late antiquity now embraces the emergence of Islam and looks towards Eurasia; another challenge is posed by the rise of global history. But these developments, with the new focus on the fall of the western empire, raise major problems of identity for Byzantium itself, and indeed for western Europe.
We cannot understand the relation of Socratic philosophy to ancient Greek religion unless we first distinguish between the natural religion of the philosophers, the mythic religion of the poets, and the civic religion of the polis. These are not three religions but three differing interpretations of Greek religion. The Socratic philosophers attack the religion of the poets in order to reform the civic religion in the light of natural religion. All three kinds of Greek religion are focused on the relations between gods and humans and on the question of whether a person can traverse the chasm between human and divine. In Greek mythology and cult, some heroic human beings, like Heracles, were able to become gods. For the Socratics, philosophers are the new Greek heroes, able to divinize themselves by dint of rational discipline.
Human belief systems and practices can be traced to ca. 10,000 BCE in the Ancient Near East, where the earliest evidence of ritual structures and objects can be found. Religious architecture, the relics of human skeletons, animal symbolism, statues, and icons all contributed to a complex network into which the spiritual essence of the divine was materially present. In this book, Nicola Laneri traces the transformation of the belief systems that shaped life in ancient Near Eastern communities, from prehistoric times until the advent of religious monotheism in the Levant during the first millennium BCE. Considering a range of evidence, from stone ceremonial enclosures, such as as Göbleki Tepe, to the construction of the first temples and icons of Mesopotamian polytheistic beliefs, to the Temple of Jerusalem, the iconic center of Israelite monotheism, Laneri offers new insights into the symbolic value embodied in the religious materiality produced in the ancient Near East.
The emotional turn in scholarship has changed the way in which historians of religion think about monotheistic traditions. New histories of religion have adapted and incorporated the totalizing sensibilities of twentieth century annalistes, the granular view of social historians, groundbreaking philosophical investigations, and the spirit of interdisciplinary collaboration between historical analysis, anthropology, and psychology. Religion as a principal bearer of culture has shaped emotional life profoundly, just as human emotion has constituted religious life. Taking a qualified constructivist approach to emotion enables understanding of the dynamism, fluidity, and ambiguity in emotional experience, alongside continuities, and facilitates analysis of how that feeling has animated religious life in monotheistic traditions. It equally sharpens insight into how monotheistic religion itself has made emotion. Affect, emotion, and mixed emotions are three categories of feelings evidenced in monotheistic religions. Each is illustrated with respect to the similarities and differences among Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
This chapter examines the biblical prophetic texts that refer to legal matters and thus raise important questions about what the authors of these speeches and texts had in mind with these references and how they relate, chronologically and theologically, to the laws of the Pentateuch.
This Element explores the relation between monotheism and fundamentalism. It does so from both an empirical perspective and a more theoretical one that combines theological and philosophical insights. The empirical part addresses how as a matter of fact, particularly quantitively, monotheism and fundamentalism relate to one another. The more theoretical part studies the relation between the two by considering the doctrine of God and the issue of exclusion, theories of revelation, and ethics. Finally, the book considers whether monotheism has particular resources that can be employed in mitigating the consequences of or even altogether preventing fundamentalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
As early as the Hellenistic period but more widely in the imperial age throughout the Roman Empire, we observe consecrations and dedications both to deities known by other theonyms and to a power in its own right, named Panthe(i)os in Greek and Pantheus in Latin. Faced with this formulation, scholars have emphasised the ‘quantitative’ force of the Greek pas, pasa, pan (translated as ‘total, universal’), interpreting this god as reflecting a process of gradual translation from the multitude of gods of Greco-Roman paganism to a ‘total’ and thus ‘universal’ god, which would thereby pave the way for Christian monotheism. The analysis of this term and its contextual applications shows that Panthe(i)os/Pantheus does not portray an abstractly ‘total’ and therefore ‘unique’ god, but a ‘super-god’ with exceptional powers called upon for the sake of pragmatic efficiency, on a religious horizon still fully perceived as plural. By choosing this name, the worshippers thus displayed their privileged relationship with the deity from whom they expected protection in a particularly effective manner.