‘Contested Concepts: Plutarch’s On Common Conceptions’ by Thomas Bénatouïl addresses the question of how ordinary concepts, for instance a layman’s concept of a spider, intersect with a zoologist’s concept of that insect. While from the epistemological point of view the latter’s concept should be allowed to prevail, from the point of view of semantics and the philosophy of mind it is not at all obvious that the scientific concept of spider should be allowed to rule over the corresponding lay concept, nor is it obvious that there is only one concept of spider whose content can be fixed for every context. Clearly, the Academics and the Stoics were aware of the importance of this and related problems. Plutarch’s dialogue On Common Conceptions, subtitled Against the Stoics, is a representative text of these schools’ respective stances, and its study by Thomas Bénatouïl aims to bring out both its historical significance and systematic interest.

In the Meno, Socrates considers, and replies to, Meno’s paradox. According to the paradox, whether or not one knows something, one can’t inquire into it. The paradox has been understood in a variety of ways: some think it is invalid; others think it is valid but unsound; those who favor the second option disagree about what the false premise is. I argue that, as Socrates understands the paradox (but not, perhaps, as Meno does), it is valid but unsound: not knowing doesn’t preclude inquiry, since one can inquire on the basis of true beliefs that fall short of knowledge. Socrates develops this theme in the geometrical discussion with one of Meno’s slaves. Another part of his reply is the theory of recollection, which is often thought to posit innate knowledge. I argue, however, that, though the theory of recollection posits prenatal knowledge, it doesn’t posit innate knowledge. I also set the paradox in a broader context, exploring the Meno’s views on inquiry, definition, knowledge, and belief.