This chapter of the handbook examines the foundational role of norms in moral psychology, a topic that has long garnered cross-disciplinary interest from philosophy to biology, from anthropology to computer science. The authors touch briefly on the debates over potentially different types of norm (e.g., conventional, social, moral, legal) and maintain that social and moral norms, in particular, are difficult to separate unless one adopts a specific theoretical position. The authors’ treatment centers on a core feature of most or all social and moral norms: that people, in complying or not complying with norms, are sensitive to other community members’ norm-relevant beliefs and attitudes. By recognizing this sensitivity, scientists can, first, gain a better scientific understanding of norm inference, the complex processes by which people learn which norms apply to a given setting and how strong the norms are; and second, they can better diagnose whether (and how strongly) a given norm exists in a community. All these insights pave the way for potential interventions on people’s beliefs about the community’s norms, which are easier to change than individual moral convictions.

Contestations about the contents and validity of laws and legal principles are fundamental to the (international) legal profession. After all, when engaging with legal norms, disagreements about their meaning and validity a central part of the day-to-day work of legal professionals specialising in international law, including legal counsel representing governments, international judges, legal officers working for international organisations and non-governmental organisations, and legal academics. We propose a practice-oriented approach to empirically research such interpretive legal contestations by groups of legal professionals. Using an interdisciplinary perspective, we contribute to IR norms research by drawing on not only IR practice theory, but also Bourdieu-inspired research within the Sociology of International Law and ongoing discussions on legal realism in International Legal Theory, including what we have called European New Legal Realism. After outlining how to implement our approach using either a Bourdieusian perspective or the concept of communities of practice, we use normative contestations in and around climate change law to illustrate its added value. Such an approach not only promises to make interpretive legal contestations visible empirically, but also emphasises how interpretive legal contestations matter as they reflect underlying power dynamics and may result in normative legal change in practice.

Chapter 5 seeks to orient the ordinary and legal concepts of hate speech. Section 5.2 uncovers various ways in which the ordinary and legal concepts of hate speech come together, including in terms of the kinds of speech they both count as hate speech. In Section 5.3, however, we turn to consider the potential sources of divergence between the ordinary and legal concepts of hate speech including the differing social functions or purposes played by the two concepts. Section 5.4 addresses the nature of the relationship and interaction between the ordinary and legal concepts of hate speech. Finally, in Section 5.5 we try to show why theoretical disagreements about the relationship between the ordinary and legal concepts of hate speech matter. In particular, we argue that uncovering these deeper disagreements can help to explain both the source of some academic controversies about the legitimacy of hate speech laws and the source of some wider public debates about the rights and wrongs of social media platform content policies on hate speech.

Chapter 8 explores the implications of the book’s narratives for the study and practice of taxation in developing countries. China has adopted taxes that are designed to be administered through self-assessment, while minimizing reliance on self-assessment. This essential modification of the modern tax paradigm has radical implications. First, it suggests substantial revisions to economic theories of tax administration and compliance. In particular, because self-assessment is quintessentially about complying with legal norms, modern taxation is deeply intertwined with legal systems: the Chinese case demonstrates how profoundly different a tax system is when severed from the legal system’s support – an idea that economic theories have ignored. Second, the evolution of Chinese tax administration both affirms and enriches a theory in political economy, namely that, to properly study tax and development, one must consider not only state capacity in tax collection, but also view such state capacity as endogenous with politics. Finally, one may query whether Chinese taxation will converge with more familiar tax paradigms. I argue that, to the contrary, technological developments could strengthen the tendency of China’s tax system to continue on its recent path; one can even ask whether other countries will converge to China’s model.

As a final comment on the outcomes of Thailand’s legal history, this chapter begins with a seemingly bizarre incident that occurred during Thai street protests in March 2010. Tens of thousands of rural demonstrators splashed their own blood on Bangkok’s public buildings to curse the ruling government and its legal and political institutions. An explanation of the demonstrators’ controversial actions is found in their reaction against efforts of the central Thai ruling elite over the past century to modernize Thai law, rationalize its religious administration, and eliminate rival systems in outlying regions. These efforts, in turn, are placed in the context of a centuries-old tradition of law, kingship, and religious purification through which Thai rulers centralized their power and demonstrated their legitimacy. The street protests in 2010 represented a failed attempt by rural workers simultaneously to claim their place in the Thai nation and to challenge its hegemony, to assert their rights under modern law, and to invoke pre-modern legal norms and identities.