John Harris has made many seminal contributions to bioethics. Two of these are in the ethics of resource allocation. Firstly, he proposed the “fair innings argument” which was the first sufficientarian approach to distributive justice. Resources should be provided to ensure people have a fair innings—when Harris first wrote this, around 70 years of life, but perhaps now 80. Secondly, Harris famously advanced the egalitarian position in response to utilitarian approaches to allocation (such as maximizing Quality Adjusted Life Years [QALYs]) that what people want is the greatest chance of the longest, best quality life for themselves, and justice requires treating these claims equally. Harris thus proposed both sufficientarian and egalitarian approaches. This chapter compares these approaches with utilitarian and contractualist approaches and provides a methodology for deciding among these (Collective Reflective Equilibrium). This methodology is applied to the allocation of ventilators in the pandemic (as an example) and an ethical algorithm for their deployment created. This paper describes the concept of algorithmic bioethics as a way of addressing pluralism of values and context specificity of moral judgment and policy, and addressing complex ethics.

This special section brings together international scholars celebrating the 40th anniversary of John Harris’ book, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (1985), and John Harris and his contributions to the field of bioethics more generally.

This paper critically engages with the work of John Harris. Its central focus is his 1985 book, The Value of Life: a foundational text in philosophical bioethics, whose relevance and resonance continue firmly to endure. My aim is to examine what it says—and omits to say—about political authority. Through analysis of apparent and substantive contradictions, and of John’s core focus on moral reasons rather than a basic moral theory, I argue that John says too little about the founding of political obligation. This is so even while he sees political obligation as morally required. I argue that the framings he gives in favor of moral requirements to accept political obligations are particularly significant because they indicate problems in the fundamentality and import of the idea of respect for persons as it features in The Value of Life.

This article examines the evolution of bioethics over the past four decades since the publication of John Harris’ seminal work, “The Value of Life” (1985). It argues that while the core principles articulated by Harris remain relevant, bioethics has undergone significant transformation across four key domains. First, the expanding frontiers of biotechnology have necessitated engagement with complex issues beyond individual clinical ethics. Second, there has been a widening of the circle of moral concern to encompass nonhuman animals, disability rights, and global health equity. Third, bioethics has become increasingly entangled with public policy and governance. Finally, the field has seen substantial academic proliferation and institutionalization. These developments have pushed bioethics to adapt its frameworks and methodologies while maintaining fidelity to foundational principles. This article concludes by considering the future challenges and opportunities for bioethics in an increasingly complex technological and social landscape.

Uterus transplants (UTx) provide women without a uterus the possibility of experiencing gestational motherhood. This paper delineates the complex bioethical landscape surrounding UTx, focusing on the critical aspects of informed consent, risk–benefit analysis, justice considerations, and the distinct challenges encountered by both donors and recipients. While not discussing UTx directly, John Harris’ seminal work, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics (1985) in its advocacy for reproductive freedom and informed consent provides an informative starting point for the discussion.

As an example, UTx is analyzed within the socio-political context of Mexico. The impact of the Mexican healthcare and legal systems on UTx procedures is discussed and the regulatory measures necessary to ensure that UTx is conducted ethically and equitably are outlined.

“INTELLECTUAL LIGHTENING”: A tribute to John Harris through a collection of memories, imaginary books, fictional reviews, and an interview. John Harris’ impressive and diverse academic career is illustrated and remembered by his colleagues who each contribute with a special memory, story or fake book review, in order to thank John and to cherish the memories. A good philosopher, a kind person, a teacher, different aspects of his work are discussed.

Putting a specific value on human life is important in many contexts and forms part of the basis for many political, administrative, commercial, and personal decisions. Sometimes, the value is set explicitly, sometimes even in monetary terms, but much more often, it is set implicitly through a decision that allows us to calculate the valuation of a life implicit in a certain rule or a certain resource allocation. We also value lives in what looks like a completely different way when we evaluate whether a particular life is being or has been lived well. Both of these ways of valuing are done from an outside or third-person perspective, but there is also a third way of valuing a life which is from the first-person perspective, and which essentially asks how much my life is worth to me. Is there any connection between these different ways of valuing life, and if so what is the connection between them? This paper provides an account of John Harris’ analysis of the value of life and discusses whether it can bridge the gap between first-person and third-person evaluations of the value of life, and whether it can do so in a way that still allows for resource allocation decisions to be made in health care and other sectors.

There are many authors who consider the so-called “moral nose” a valid epistemological tool in the field of morality. The expression was used by George Orwell, following in Friedrich Nietzsche’s footsteps and was very clearly described by Leo Tolstoy. It has also been employed by authors such as Elisabeth Anscombe, Bernard Williams, Noam Chomsky, Stuart Hampshire, Mary Warnock, and Leon Kass. This article examines John Harris’ detailed criticism of what he ironically calls the “olfactory school of moral philosophy.” Harris’ criticism is contrasted with Jonathan Glover’s defense of the moral nose. Glover draws some useful distinctions between the various meanings that the notion of moral nose can assume. Finally, the notion of moral nose is compared with classic notions such as Aristotelian phronesis, Heideggerian aletheia, and the concept of “sentiment” proposed by the philosopher Thomas Reid. The conclusion reached is that morality cannot be based only on reason, or—as David Hume would have it—only on feelings.

In our book Unfit for the Future and a number of papers, we have argued that there is a dangerous mismatch between, on the one hand, the tremendous power of scientific technology, which has created societies with millions of citizens, and, on the other hand, our moral capacities, which have been shaped by evolution for life in small, close-knit societies with primitive technology. To overcome this mismatch before it results in the downfall of human civilization, human beings stand in acute need of moral enhancement, not only by traditional means but also by biomedical means, should this turn out to be possible. After summarizing this argument, we respond to two critics, Michael Hauskeller and Robert Sparrow.