This is by far the longest chapter in the book. It takes the archaeological picture and returns to the biblical material, as analyzed critically in Chapter 2. Putting names and details to the generalities, it shows how the move to centralized sites fits with the biblical picture of Saul, the expansion of the highland polity into the surrounding areas fits with the biblical picture of David, and the building program plus investment in copper mining fits with that of Solomon. The chapter delves into many specifics such as the evidence from Khirbet Qeiyafa, David’s competition with Ish-Boshet, and the list of Solomon’s officials. It uses both minute archaeological information and specific details from the biblical descriptions to present a thorough reconstruction of the sociopolitical developments of the tenth century, and of the kingdoms of Saul, David and Solomon.

Based on all the specifics teased out in Chapter 15, this chapter takes a wide view. While the narrative arc focuses on the general contours of the biblical account and the chapter retells the narrative of the United Monarchy from beginning to end, it is the archaeological and historical reality that is the driving explanatory force. Thus many aspects of the biblical account (especially those that relate to the relationship between Saul and David) are presented very differently than the traditional model, as we retell the biblical story as we think it really happened.

In the late Iron I, the Galilee was dotted with small farming villages. In the early Iron II, these were all abandoned while at the same time, large, fortified towns such as Hazor were built in the adjacent regions. The two processes were connected, reflecting the Israelite takeover of the region. As the highland polity expanded into the hilly Galilee, the local groups, many of which had a similar background and lifestyle, had to choose whether to affiliate with it or fight against it. Many, especially in more mountainous regions, simply became Israelite “tribes,” whereas settlements that were regarded as non-Israelites (“Canaanites”) were mostly destroyed. Like in other regions, the result was a complete reshuffling in settlement patterns, and the new polity built new centers to control the area. Here, however, the new polity had to contend with another polity, Tyre, with which it wished to remain on friendly terms. Thus, the western part of the Galilee (along with the Galilee coast) was left in Phoenician hands.

The Shephelah (Judean lowlands) was only sparsely inhabited in the Iron I, with just a string of small Canaanite villages surviving the upheavals of the thirteenth and twelfth centuries BCE, forming a tiny enclave between the Philistines in the coastal plain and the Israelites of the highlands. And yet, in the Iron IIA this same area became packed with towns. The chapter investigates this drastic change, taking place in the tenth century BCE, in tandem with many other changes addressed in other chapters. It shows that the resettlement of the Shephelah was a long process, and that about a generation after the failed attempt to settle Khirbet Qeiyafa, the settlers of Canaanite villages suddenly got off the fence and joined forces with the emerging Israelite polity. This phase is evident by the growth in size experienced by the small Canaanite villages in the first half of the tenth century, when some of them were even fortified, and the finds in them show clear connections with the nascent highland kingdom. Shortly afterward, as part of the colonization of the Shephelah by the United Monarchy, new sites were settled and fortified, exhibiting the growing power of the highland polity.

The Sharon Plain suffers from drainage problems and poor soil. For much of history, the region was only sparsely inhabited, suffering severe demographic fluctuations. The Iron Age IIA stands out as a period during which settlement in the Sharon, and especially in the Yarkon basin (the Sharon’s southernmost part), reached a peak before plummeting in the Iron Age IIB. What caused this unusual fluctuation? The only reason to build new settlements in the swampy Sharon was for serving as an inland polity’s outlet to the sea, so the key is to understand who could benefit from investing in this region, and especially in the Yarkon basin. A center in Samaria or the Hebron hill country would have had better port cities – Dor or Ashkelon, respectively. Only a polity with a center in the area around Jerusalem could benefit – and greatly so – from a port in the Yarkon basin. This, along with other lines of evidence (e.g., Excursus 8.1), suggests that the highland polity expanded to this area and controlled it for a few generations. Once the United Monarchy collapsed, there was no incentive to maintain the swampy region and the settlements were gradually abandoned.

Most of the cities in the fertile Jezreel, Beth-Shean, and the adjacent valleys, which flourished in the Iron I, were destroyed in the beginning of the Iron IIA. Some were then rebuilt along very different lines. At the same time, in contrast to the large-scale village abandonment occurring throughout the land, some farming villages continued and were even established. What happened to the cities and what connection might there be to the continued existence of the villages? It appears that the expanding highland polity conquered the region and destroyed most cities – the only exceptions being cities that collaborated with them – transferring some of the inhabitants of these destroyed cities, before rebuilding some of them, often along different lines. This newly conquered area was important economically not only because of the roads that crossed it, but also because of its agricultural potential. Thus the new polity maintained many villages there, even transferring population from the conquered cities to these villages.

The evidence from Transjordan reveals a pattern: Most areas in the Transjordan experienced a wave of abandonment at around the middle of the tenth century BCE, whereas some regions flourished. The common denominator of the former is that it includes territories associated with Ammon and Moab, whereas the latter pattern is typical of regions that the Bible describes as Israelite. It appears that as Israel expanded, some groups opposed it and were defeated, suffering the consequences. Other groups, perhaps of similar backgrounds, joined Israel and adopted its identity (e.g., in the Gilead); subsequently, they flourished. Israelite expansion can therefore explain the changing pattern in Transjordan, even if not all the areas that suffered abandonment were actually conquered by Israel. It is likely that Israelite aggression resulted in a wave of abandonment beyond the area of actual Israelite control.

This chapter collates the archaeological evidence presented in Part II. It begins with a reassessment of the evidence put forward to refute the historical plausibility of the United Monarchy, showing that it did not stand the test of time and that in the long run, the challenges raised failed to shake the kingdom’s foundations. The chapter then moves on to integrate the archaeological evidence into a coherent picture of the United Monarchy’s establishment, expansion, and solidification. Finally, it reviews the theoretical underpinning of the discussion, arguing that much of the debate was based on a red herring, leading to an evaluation of the United Monarchy in comparison to well-established empires such as Assyria and Rome, rather than short-lived empires, which is further developed in Chapter 14.