When academically inclined atheists critique arguments for the existence of God, they commonly target arguments of Intelligent Design as proposed by Paley, Dembski, and Behe. In so doing, it is not uncommon for them to include within the scope of their criticisms Aquinas's fifth proof for the existence of God – the proof from final causality. In this essay, I shall argue that there are very significant differences between the Fifth Way and the more modern arguments of Intelligent Design which means that any critique offered in regard to the latter normally leaves the former unscathed. Moreover, I shall also argue that the Intelligent Design approach concedes some of the erroneous premises of the atheists’ own arguments and that these are in no way conceded by Aquinas in the Fifth Way or elsewhere.

In light of Aquinas's teaching, I first critique William Dembski's mathematical approach to design in nature, and then critique Michael Behe's failure to distinguish between causes that physically produce an object and causes responsible for the plan for that object. I then investigate Aquinas's Fifth Way, both comparing it to Paley's argument, and attempting to discern where it disagrees with atheistic accounts of evolution. I show that Aquinas acknowledges that living things can result from finality at one level and chance at another level; in other words, he acknowledges that contingent intermediary causes are able to be part of God's plan or design for the production of new species. Thus, the disagreement between Aquinas and the proponents of atheistic versions of evolution is not due to any denial on his part that chance may have role in the production of new species. I then show that even atheist biologists and philosophers recognize a regular tendency in nature to something good, namely, the tendency for niches to be filled, resulting in the good of biodiversity. Where they and Aquinas part ways is as to whether things that lack cognition can only tend to an end when directed by an intelligent being.

This paper reports the results of a questionnaire administered to university students, about several questions involving the origin of the Universe and life and biological evolution, as well as questions related to more common scientific themes. As few as between 2.4% (philosophy students) and 14% (geography students) did not accept the theory of evolution, because they believed in creation as described in the Bible. However, between 41.5% (philosophy students) and 71.3% (biology students) did not see any conflict between religion and evolution. About 80% of the students believed that the relationship between lung cancer and smoking is well established by science, but this number falls to 65% for biological evolution and 28.9% for the big bang theory. It should be pointed out that for 24.5% and 7.4% of the students the big bang theory and biological evolution, respectively, are poorly established by science. The students who self-reported being Christian but not Roman Catholic are more conservative in the acceptance of biological evolution and the old age of Earth and the Universe than are other groups of students. Other factors, such as family income and the level of education of parents, appear to influence the students' acceptance of themes related to the origin of the Universe and biological evolution.

This article pursues the question of whether William Paley's Natural Theology is an Anglican classic. I place Paley's natural theology project in its historical context of skepticism about Christianity's truth claims and in the context of Paley's ‘system’. His teleological argument is briefly explained and four challenges, past and present, to its thesis are considered. The question of what makes a work a classic is explored in terms of its enduring interest, especially in the light of the controversy concerning Intelligent Design Theory, and its enduring value. It is argued that because of its enduring interest and value Paley's Natural Theology may be judged a classic but not of a peculiarly Anglican kind.

The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is “like” to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive “system” dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.