Chapter 9 begins by evaluating the intelligence war's effectiveness against rural IRA units, particularly in the republican heartlands of south Armagh, east Tyrone and Fermanagh. The East Tyrone and Newry IRA did face setbacks. Nonetheless, in many rural areas the IRA’s elusive nature made the organisation difficult to infiltrate and restrain. I explore why rural IRA units were often hard to infiltrate. The resilience of rural units, particularly in south Armagh, provided momentum for the IRA’s campaign in terms of arms, explosives and expertise, which had even been transferred to high-profile IRA operations in England by the 1990s. I also detail how, in England, IRA activity had increased in intensity by the 1990s. IRA attacks in England alongside the ability of the IRA to import various consignments of heavy weapons from Libya suggests that the IRA leadership had not been infiltrated at its highest levels. I provide reasons to explain the lack of infiltration of IRA units in England and the IRA leadership. Examples discussed in the chapter include the effectiveness of the British Army watchtowers in south Armagh, and intelligence operations carried out against the IRA in England during the 1980s.