Book contents
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I The Intelligence War: August 1969 to July 1972
- Part II On the Verge of Defeat? The Intelligence War: July 1972 to December 1975
- Part III The Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 1998
- 7 British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: 1976–1998
- 8 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Belfast and Derry City, January 1976 to August 1994
- 9 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Rural Areas and England and the IRA Leadership, January 1976 to August 1994
- 10 ‘It’s the Primacy of Politics That’s Important’: Alternative Reasons for the IRA’s Ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997
- Conclusion
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - The Intelligence War against the IRA in Rural Areas and England and the IRA Leadership, January 1976 to August 1994
from Part III - The Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 1998
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2020
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I The Intelligence War: August 1969 to July 1972
- Part II On the Verge of Defeat? The Intelligence War: July 1972 to December 1975
- Part III The Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 1998
- 7 British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: 1976–1998
- 8 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Belfast and Derry City, January 1976 to August 1994
- 9 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Rural Areas and England and the IRA Leadership, January 1976 to August 1994
- 10 ‘It’s the Primacy of Politics That’s Important’: Alternative Reasons for the IRA’s Ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997
- Conclusion
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Chapter 9 begins by evaluating the intelligence war's effectiveness against rural IRA units, particularly in the republican heartlands of south Armagh, east Tyrone and Fermanagh. The East Tyrone and Newry IRA did face setbacks. Nonetheless, in many rural areas the IRA’s elusive nature made the organisation difficult to infiltrate and restrain. I explore why rural IRA units were often hard to infiltrate. The resilience of rural units, particularly in south Armagh, provided momentum for the IRA’s campaign in terms of arms, explosives and expertise, which had even been transferred to high-profile IRA operations in England by the 1990s. I also detail how, in England, IRA activity had increased in intensity by the 1990s. IRA attacks in England alongside the ability of the IRA to import various consignments of heavy weapons from Libya suggests that the IRA leadership had not been infiltrated at its highest levels. I provide reasons to explain the lack of infiltration of IRA units in England and the IRA leadership. Examples discussed in the chapter include the effectiveness of the British Army watchtowers in south Armagh, and intelligence operations carried out against the IRA in England during the 1980s.
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- The Intelligence War against the IRA , pp. 164 - 198Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020