Cities around the world are facing a global housing crisis characterized by rising unaffordability, slums, gentrification, inequality, and urban segregation. The Global Financial Crisis highlighted the detrimental impact of highly financialized housing markets. This Article argues that transitioning from a market-based to a welfare-oriented approach is both necessary and feasible to ensure the right to adequate housing for everyone. This shift requires a fundamental re-imagining of housing issues, recognizing that the root causes lie in a political economy where law plays a pivotal role, crossing traditional boundaries between private and public law. We illustrate the legal foundations of adopting a welfare-based approach to the political economy of housing law, contrasting it with a market-based approach in three key areas: Land use regulation, housing finance, and rental markets.

Comparative welfare and production regime literature has so far neglected the considerable cross-country differences in the sphere of housing. The United States became a country of homeowners living in cities of single-family houses in the twentieth century. Its housing policy was focused on supporting private mortgage indebtedness with only residual public housing. Germany, on the contrary, remained a tenant-dominated country with cities of multi-unit buildings. Its housing policy has been focused on construction subsidies to non-profit housing associations and incentives for savings earmarked for financing housing. The article claims that these differences are the outcome of different housing institutions that had already emerged in the nineteenth century. Germany developed non-profit housing associations and financed housing through mortgage banks, both privileging the construction of rental apartments. In the United States, savings and loan associations favored mortgages for owner-occupied, single-family house construction. When governments intervened during housing crises in the 1920/1930s, they aimed their subsidies at these existing institutions. Thus, US housing policy became finance-biased in favor of savings and loan associations, while Germany supported the housing cooperatives.

Housing finance and, specifically, the subprime private label securitisation market in the US, was at the epicentre of the global financial crisis. Excessive debt expansion in the run-up to the crisis resulted in credit risk, under-identified and mispriced ex ante, and in systemic risk. This paper considers the role of financial innovation in debt markets and the changing market structure of securitisation in the evolution of the US housing price bubble. New financing vehicles contributed to growing risk, but the more salient factor was the change in the structure of securitisation, which led to unsustainable levels of debt.