• Following growth of 3.1 per cent in 2013, the world economy will grow by 3.3 per cent in 2014 and 3.5 per cent in 2015.

• The pace of recovery remains slow and uneven; much of the Euro Area in particular remains very depressed, and the policy response has so far been too little, too late.

• Key risks include the normalisation of monetary policy in the US, and the associated financial market turbulence; and worsening deflationary pressures in the Euro Area exacerbated by policy gridlock.

• After growing by 3 per cent in 2014 the economy will grow by 2.5 per cent in 2015

• Unemployment will stabilise at about 5.5 per cent.

• CPI inflation will be close to target this year and next; we expect interest rates to begin to rise gradually from the middle of 2015.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho Research Institute Ltd, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.

The house price and lending boom of the 2000s is widely considered to be the main cause of the financial crisis that began in 2007. However, looking to the past, we find a similar boom in the late 1980s which did not lead directly to a global systemic banking crisis – there were widespread banking difficulties in the early 1990s but these were linked mainly to commercial property exposures. This raises the question whether the received wisdom is incorrect, and other factors than the housing boom caused the crisis, while macroprudential policy is overly targeted at the control of house prices and lending per se.

Accordingly, in this paper we compare and contrast the cycles in house prices over 1985–94 with 2002–11. There are more similarities than contrasts between the booms. Stylised facts include a similar rise in real house prices where booms took place, and a marked rise in the real mortgage stock along with real incomes. The aftermath periods are also comparable in terms of house price changes. Econometrically, determinants of house prices are similar in size and sign from the 1980s to date.

There remain some contrasts. Leverage rose far more in the later episode and did not contract in the aftermath. Mean reversion of house prices is greater in the earlier period. The earlier boom period showed differences with average house price behaviour which was not mirrored in the most recent boom and inflation was higher. Despite the contrasts, on balance we reject the idea that the recent boom was in some way unique and hence the key cause of the crisis. There is a need for further research to capture distinctive structural and conjunctural factors underlying the recent crisis which differ from the earlier boom and some suggestions are made.

The recent crisis has underlined the importance of the interaction of financial innovations and the housing market. We consider five major innovations relevant to housing finance. These are (i) mortgages; (ii) specialised housing finance institutions; (iii) government interventions in housing finance in the US during the Great Depression; (iv) covered bonds; and (v) securitised mortgages. The history of these innovations and their positive and negative aspects are discussed. Future innovations to help the stability of the housing market are also suggested.

Housing finance and, specifically, the subprime private label securitisation market in the US, was at the epicentre of the global financial crisis. Excessive debt expansion in the run-up to the crisis resulted in credit risk, under-identified and mispriced ex ante, and in systemic risk. This paper considers the role of financial innovation in debt markets and the changing market structure of securitisation in the evolution of the US housing price bubble. New financing vehicles contributed to growing risk, but the more salient factor was the change in the structure of securitisation, which led to unsustainable levels of debt.

The Canadian system of housing finance proved to be resilient and efficient during the global financial crisis and its aftermath. The system's effectiveness is the result of a rigorous prudential regulatory and supervisory regime coupled with targeted government guarantees of mortgage insurance and securitisation products. In the post-crisis period, household debt levels and house prices have risen, owing, in part, to accommodative monetary conditions necessary to support the economic recovery. These vulnerabilities were mitigated by tightening macroprudential policy, specifically mortgage insurance rules, and strengthening mortgage-underwriting standards. Looking ahead, the housing finance framework needs to be adjusted and strengthened by rebalancing the risk exposures away from the government towards the private sector participants in the housing finance market. Although some measures have already been taken for this purpose, more adjustments may be needed to create the right incentives and achieve a sustainable rebalancing in risk exposures. Measures should also be considered to promote a liquid private-label mortgage securitisation market in Canada.

This paper describes the Danish mortgage system by comparing it with the UK mortgage system. The Danish mortgage system has attracted attention in the literature on the design of mortgage systems. It is a type of narrow banking model where mortgage loans are financed by specialised institutions that issue bonds with cash flows that match that of the mortgage loans. Thereby, the Danish mortgage system outsources many of the risks that are usually kept on the balance sheet of banks to bond investors. Measured in terms of four criteria, the Danish mortgage system performed better during the financial crisis than the UK mortgage system. However, both in Denmark and the UK, alignment of the mortgage and the pension systems could offer significant advantages.