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The Hughes Court: From Progressivism to Pluralism, 1930 to 1941 describes the closing of one era in constitutional jurisprudence and the opening of another. This comprehensive study of the Supreme Court from 1930 to 1941 – when Charles Evans Hughes was Chief Justice – shows how nearly all justices, even the most conservative, accepted the broad premises of a Progressive theory of government and the Constitution. The Progressive view gradually increased its hold throughout the decade, but at its end, interest group pluralism began to influence the law. By 1941, constitutional and public law was discernibly different from what it had been in 1930, but there was no sharp or instantaneous Constitutional Revolution in 1937 despite claims to the contrary. This study supports its conclusions by examining the Court's work in constitutional law, administrative law, the law of justiciability, civil rights and civil liberties, and statutory interpretation.
Religion, shared values, and history led American politicians to support the Zionist cause during the inter-war years. Presidents, politicians, and the American people supported the Zionist aspirations, although, it was only after the Second World War that the Americans became actively involved in Zionist affairs. During the inter-war years, the British government acted to fulfil the commitment it made in 1917 to help the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine. When the winds of war were blowing across Europe, the British began to back out of from the mandate and their commitments, and the Zionists turned to the United States for support. This marked a change in the Zionist attitude toward the United States – they wanted to see the United States extend its sponsorship of the Zionist enterprise. The ideological infrastructure for such a tutelage already existed; now the Zionists expected the Americans to act upon their ideology. During the war years, more promises were made than actions taken. However, when the war was over, and a new president, Harry S. Truman, occupied the White House, ideas inspired action, and President Truman acted to assist the Jews in attaining their goal of statehood.
Chapter 5 investigates my counter-example, the rogue diplomat whose indiscipline harmed U.S. interests. Joseph P. Kennedy, a contributor to Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1932 and 1936 election campaigns, demanded Embassy London as a reward, and FDR obliged. Upon arriving in Britain, Kennedy concluded that Adolf Hitler's Wermacht was invincible, that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's strategy of appeasement was correct, and that America had to remain neutral. Kennedy repeatedly misrepresented the Roosevelt administration's anti-fascist policy. Whereas FDR and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were endeavoring to bring American--and world - opinion around to a posture of resistance to Hitler, Kennedy proclaimed that America had no stake in the conflict and that, moreover, he expected Germany to win any war that might break out. No matter how often FDR ordered Kennedy to hold his tongue, he would not comply. Germany's 1939 invasion of Poland horrified the ambassador, who forecast an end to democracy in Europe and America. At the close of Kennedy's thousand days in London, Anglo-American relations were in tatters and Britain stood alone against the Nazi juggernaut. Few did more than Kennedy to bring about this hideous state of affairs.
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