According to conciliatory views on the significance of disagreement, it’s rational for you to become less confident in your take on an issue in case your epistemic peer’s take on it is different. These views are intuitively appealing, but they also face a powerful objection: in scenarios that involve disagreements over their own correctness, conciliatory views appear to self-defeat and, thereby, issue inconsistent recommendations. This paper provides a response to this objection. Drawing on the work from defeasible logics paradigm and abstract argumentation, it develops a formal model of conciliatory reasoning and explores its behavior in the troubling scenarios. The model suggests that the recommendations that conciliatory views issue in such scenarios are perfectly reasonable—even if outwardly they may look odd.

We address the problem of compiling defeasible theories to Datalog¬ programs. We prove the correctness of this compilation, for the defeasible logic DL(∂||), but the techniques we use apply to many other defeasible logics. Structural properties of DL(∂||) are identified that support efficient implementation and/or approximation of the conclusions of defeasible theories in the logic, compared with other defeasible logics. We also use previously well-studied structural properties of logic programs to adapt to incomplete Datalog¬ implementations.

Defeasible logics provide several linguistic features to support the expression of defeasible knowledge. There is also a wide variety of such logics, expressing different intuitions about defeasible reasoning. However, the logics can only combine in trivial ways. This limits their usefulness in contexts where different intuitions are at play in different aspects of a problem. In particular, in some legal settings, different actors have different burdens of proof, which might be expressed as reasoning in different defeasible logics. In this paper, we introduce annotated defeasible logic as a flexible formalism permitting multiple forms of defeasibility, and establish some properties of the formalism.

The paper proposes a fresh look at the concept of goal and advances that motivational attitudes like desire, goal and intention are just facets of the broader notion of (acceptable) outcome. We propose to encode the preferences of an agent as sequences of “alternative acceptable outcomes”. We then study how the agent's beliefs and norms can be used to filter the mental attitudes out of the sequences of alternative acceptable outcomes. Finally, we formalise such intuitions in a novel Modal Defeasible Logic and we prove that the resulting formalisation is computationally feasible.

Maher (2012) introduced an approach for relative expressiveness of defeasible logics, and two notions of relative expressiveness were investigated. Using the first of these definitions of relative expressiveness, we show that all the defeasible logics in the DL framework are equally expressive under this formulation of relative expressiveness. The second formulation of relative expressiveness is stronger than the first. However, we show that logics incorporating individual defeat are equally expressive as the corresponding logics with team defeat. Thus the only differences in expressiveness of logics in DL arise from differences in how ambiguity is handled. This completes the study of relative expressiveness in DL begun in Maher (2012).

We address the relative expressiveness of defeasible logics in the framework DL. Relative expressiveness is formulated as the ability to simulate the reasoning of one logic within another logic. We show that such simulations must be modular, in the sense that they also work if applied only to part of a theory, in order to achieve a useful notion of relative expressiveness. We present simulations showing that logics in DL with and without the capability of team defeat are equally expressive. We also show that logics that handle ambiguity differently – ambiguity blocking versus ambiguity propagating – have distinct expressiveness, with neither able to simulate the other under a different formulation of expressiveness.

We provide a method of translating theories of Nute's defeasible logic into logic programs, and a corresponding translation in the opposite direction. Under certain natural restrictions, the conclusions of defeasible theories under the ambiguity propagating defeasible logic ADL correspond to those of the well-founded semantics for normal logic programs, and so it turns out that the two formalisms are closely related. Using the same translation of logic programs into defeasible theories, the semantics for the ambiguity blocking defeasible logic NDL can be seen as indirectly providing an ambiguity blocking semantics for logic programs. We also provide antimonotone operators for both ADL and NDL, each based on the Gelfond–Lifschitz (GL) operator for logic programs. For defeasible theories without defeaters or priorities on rules, the operator for ADL corresponds to the GL operator and so can be seen as partially capturing the consequences according to ADL. Similarly, the operator for NDL captures the consequences according to NDL, though in this case no restrictions on theories apply. Both operators can be used to define stable model semantics for defeasible theories.

Defeasible reasoning is a simple but efficient approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that has recently attracted considerable interest and that has found various applications. Defeasible logic and its variants are an important family of defeasible reasoning methods. So far no relationship has been established between defeasible logic and mainstream nonmonotonic reasoning approaches. In this paper we establish close links to known semantics of logic programs. In particular, we give a translation of a defeasible theory $D$ into a meta-program $P(D)$. We show that under a condition of decisiveness, the defeasible consequences of $D$ correspond exactly to the sceptical conclusions of $P(D)$ under the stable model semantics. Without decisiveness, the result holds only in one direction (all defeasible consequences of $D$ are included in all stable models of $P(D)$). If we wish a complete embedding for the general case, we need to use the Kunen semantics of $P(D)$, instead.