This study examines the effects of borrowing for public services that increase households' utility (i.e., utility-generating government services) in an AK endogenous growth model. We assume that the government has a target debt ratio. The European Union and the United Kingdom adopt such debt policy rules. We find that application of a debt policy rule into utility-generating government spending causes indeterminacy of the transition path. We point out that the level of the target debt ratio, the tax rate, and the household utility parameters are important determinants of indeterminacy when considering utility-generating government services.

We construct an endogenous growth model that includes productive public capital and government debt. We assume that the government debt-to-GDP ratio is gradually adjusted to a target level, reflecting the permanent commitment rules in the Stability and Growth Pact or the Maastricht Treaty in the European Union (i.e., the well-known 60% rule). These rules affect government borrowing and public investment. Here, we examine the welfare implications of the permanent commitment rules. We find that fiscal consolidation based on the rules improves social welfare. Moreover, the improvement in welfare accelerates as fiscal consolidation progresses more rapidly. Last, we also discuss and derive the optimal long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.