Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of Global Migrations presents an authoritative overview of the various continuities and changes in migration and globalization from the 1800s to the present day. Despite revolutionary changes in communication technologies, the growing accessibility of long-distance travel, and globalization across major economies, the rise of nation-states empowered immigration regulation and bureaucratic capacities for enforcement that curtailed migration. One major theme worldwide across the post-1800 centuries was the differentiation between “skilled” and “unskilled” workers, often considered through a racialized lens; it emerged as the primary divide between greater rights of immigration and citizenship for the former, and confinement to temporary or unauthorized migrant status for the latter. Through thirty-one chapters, this volume further evaluates the long global history of migration; and it shows that despite the increased disciplinary systems, the primacy of migration remains and continues to shape political, economic, and social landscapes around the world.

Tapping the power of fossil fuels over the past century and a half has propelled a massive expansion of human enterprise and prosperity, yet it has also released toxic amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, thereby endangering the future viability of human civilization. If global average temperatures rise 4 to 6 degrees above the level of preindustrial times, climate scientists nearly unanimously conclude that severe disruptions of global ecosystems will result. These disruptions include: self-reinforcing spirals of global warming caused by feedback factors like melting permafrost, ice loss, water vapor, and wildfires; acidification of ocean waters and flooding of coastal regions as sea level rises by as much as one foot per decade; growing frequency of severe weather events such as droughts, floods, superstorms, and heat waves; the spread of tropical diseases into temperate regions; and the collapse of agriculture in many parts of the planet, leading to waves of desperate climate refugees.

Extreme weather events and catastrophic disasters have led to the widespread damage and destruction of homes and communities, and have produced large levels of involuntary displacement. Globally, the numbers of displaced persons are expected to grow due to the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, increased population exposure, and vulnerability to natural hazards. Several sociolegal complexities and dilemmas arise in addressing the needs of displaced populations and disaster survivors for which policy, governance, and legal solutions are not clearly defined. In this chapter, we draw on theories of social constructionism and contend that social constructions of displaced populations can affect the adoption, design, and implementation of laws and policies that apply to disaster survivors and displaced populations. Specifically, we examine how the perceptions, framing, and characterization of target groups of displaced populations such as school-aged children, homeless and highly mobile families, and long-time residents who have precarious forms of immigration status, can influence governance issues that may arise during post-disaster recovery both within affected and host communities. The findings suggest that despite formal expectations of equal legal treatment, positive and negative social constructions of target populations can lead to benefits and losses for those affected and displaced by disaster.

Lack of progress in climate change negotiations, accompanied with an overall sense of despair, has led civil society organisations to attempt different strategies in order to mobilise public opinion and push states towards more ambitious climate action. One notably strategy has been the use of national and international courts, with the hope that these will fill in the regulatory gap and force states into action. Many of these claims are relevant for climate refugees, whether explicitly (e.g. by addressing displacement) or indirectly (e.g. by addressing related questions such causality). While this trend is very much still ongoing, enough decisions have been made to allow for an interim assessment of this strategy. This chapter claims that while the appeal to courts have led to some progress, one must consider also the pitfalls inherent in this strategy.

This chapter debates the displacement impacts of climate change. Is there a need for some sort of law on ‘climate migration’? Above all, does it make sense to talk about climate migration as a discrete phenomenon? Ingrid Boas argues that ‘climate mobility’ is real and observable and takes many forms (hence climate mobilities), including that of immobility (the decision to stay put despite the pressures to move). She makes the case for this phenomenon being a proper subject of research and governance. Calum Nicholson, by contrast, argues that climate migration researchers literally have no idea what they are talking about. These scholars, he claims, have made a virtue of imprecision in order to keep attracting research grants to study the individual experiences of those allegedly affected by the impacts of climate change, from which no generalizations could possibly be drawn.

This chapter debates the displacement impacts of climate change. Is there a need for some sort of law on ‘climate migration’? Above all, does it make sense to talk about climate migration as a discrete phenomenon? Ingrid Boas argues that ‘climate mobility’ is real and observable and takes many forms (hence climate mobilities), including that of immobility (the decision to stay put despite the pressures to move). She makes the case for this phenomenon being a proper subject of research and governance. Calum Nicholson, by contrast, argues that climate migration researchers literally have no idea what they are talking about. These scholars, he claims, have made a virtue of imprecision in order to keep attracting research grants to study the individual experiences of those allegedly affected by the impacts of climate change, from which no generalizations could possibly be drawn.