Tactical litigation is a reality of the adversarial litigation framework that is currently in place. However, there is a difference between the tactical litigation of choosing a forum which may have more favorable law or be more convenient and choosing a forum with the intent to drive the opposing party to failure. The latter has been the issue with some of the tactical litigation that has occurred under the European Union’s framework of lis pendens. While the Recast Brussels I Regulation has alleviated some of those issues, it has not addressed all of them. While some scholars have argued that these issues of lis pendens may be answered by introducing the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens to these proceedings, that is not the case. This Article explores the pitfalls of lis pendens and forum non conveniens and ultimately finds that forum non conveniens is unable to solve the issues lis pendens creates in tactical litigation. Furthermore, the Article finds that forum non conveniens, inherently and acting as it should, has its own problems which echo lis pendens’ own issues in the European Union. Furthermore, forum non conveniens is simply incompatible with the policies the European Union implemented with lis pendens. Ultimately, forum non conveniens is unable to answer the problems lis pendens has created and solutions must be found from within the European Union’s own civil system.

Federal law prohibits deceiving the public by falsely marking an item as patented. The “false marking” prohibition has been enforced primarily by private lawsuits on behalf of the United States, with the party plaintiff and the government splitting the penalty. When a court decision dramatically increased the potential recovery for false marking claims, lawyers pounced immediately, filing more cases per week than had previously been filed in years. Indeed, many lawyers who did not previously work on patent cases joined the fray. Within two years, Congress eliminated this type of false marking suit and terminated all pending cases. Using empirical data, interviews with lawyers, legislative history, litigation documents, and news sources, this article tells the instructive history of false marking litigation. This history shows that the supply of private enforcement—lawsuits by private parties to enforce laws in the public interest—is sensitive to market forces. It also shows that, even when concentrated interests encourage Congress to cut back on private enforcement, Congress does not move as quickly as the bar. This matters because once Congress authorizes private enforcement, the maintenance of that system depends on judges and lawyers interpreting private enforcement statutes.

Suppose that people seek confidentiality in what would otherwise be a public process—such as litigating or applying for a firearms license—because they are afraid that publicly identifying them will stigmatize them in their (or their families’) religious communities. Should the law allow them to proceed anonymously to better protect their interests and to avoid discouraging their lawsuits or applications? Or would that unduly stigmatize the religious community by branding it as improperly censorious or judgmental—or interfere with religious community members’ ability to evaluate for themselves how their coreligionists are using the courts and other government processes?

This paper examines in three parts how ADR is being embedded into the English civil justice system. Section 1 discusses how courts encourage settlements, and it argues that while mounting costs in litigation lead to negotiated settlements, the participation in ADR primarily mainly occurs when parties are referred to it in a timely manner. Section 2 investigates the time when disputants are referred to ADR, and it proposes a taxonomy formed by three stages in the dispute life cycle: (1) before parties contemplate litigation; (2) at the pre-action phase as a pre-condition to issue a claim; and (3) after a defence is entered. Section 3 notes that the court digitalisation program is increasing ADR referrals across the above three stages, and it argues that these referrals will be more effective when they are timely and coupled with suitable incentives and sanctions, but the latter must take into consideration the parties’ power asymmetries.

Exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is often discussed in relation to criminal proceedings, but not civil proceedings, where concerns about wrongdoing of state actors and deprivation of liberty are not usually present. It is sometimes assumed that judges in civil proceedings in England and Wales had no discretion to exclude relevant and reliable evidence based on how it was obtained (as a distinct concern from exclusion of evidence of little probative value) prior to the enactment of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. This paper seeks to demonstrate that this is wrong, arguing that a number of sources of power to exclude evidence on the basis of how that evidence was obtained have arisen in England and Wales, and that these are not attributable to the Civil Procedure Rules. There is a discretion which enables exclusion of evidence where this is ‘in the interests of justice’, and a discretion to do with the administration of justice. It may be possible to break these down further, to concerns over abuse of the court's own procedures, and executive illegality. Analysing the decisions leading to these developments reveals the importance of human rights concerns to recognition of exclusionary discretion in civil proceedings, and for informing the content of the discretion/s.

For over half a century, it has been axiomatic that environmental claims are particularly well suited for class actions. This paper examines this notion in the context of Ontario’s regime and finds that environmental class actions have been limited in the extent to which they have promoted access to justice. Starting with a brief overview of class action history in Canada and the economics of mass litigation at a general level, the paper then analyzes barriers specific to environmental claims. A series of representative case studies is then offered to substantiate the central contention on the limits of environmental class actions. In so doing, the paper takes a holistic approach, incorporating empirical, economic, political, and procedural factors and dynamics to provide an integrated assessment about the type of access to justice that is presently achieved and achievable for environmental claims in Ontario.

This article undertakes a reconstruction of the legal scheme under which the working class in Quebec had to operate, from the enactment of the Civil Code of Lower Canada in 1866 to the adoption of provincial accident legislation in 1909. Examination of the laws governing wage labour shows a quite blatant contradiction of the liberal ideal of the formal legal equality of all individuals: in many respects, the marginalization of workers is at the core of Quebec’s civil law at the time. During that period, however, Quebec revised the content of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure as it applied to workers on a relatively frequent basis. The limited nature of those reforms, some of which were complex and difficult to put into effect, appears to suggest that the legalistic approach to social issues had been exhausted as a response to the social upheavals instigated by wage labor, its risks and weaknesses.

This paper traces a key example of the overlap between tort and crime and explains the impact of how disjointed English legal thinking has been. For about 400 years English civil courts have accepted some form of pre-eminence of the criminal law where civil and serious criminal liability co-exist. This has often been described as the rule that “a trespass merges in a felony” though a more neutral term would be a “timing rule”. The development of the timing rules casts light on how English legal reasoning has approached the relationship between the victim and the state, the procedural context of substantive rules and the impact rules in one area of law can have elsewhere.

Lesley Dingle, founder of the Eminent Scholars Archive, provides a further contribution based on interviews with Emeritus Professor John Anthony “Tony” Jolowicz, one of the great legal scholars at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Trinity College since 1952.