Given the relative dominance of positivist epistemologies in political science, the most common mode of comparison is that of variation finding. Although such models can take many forms, the objective is to identify what factors or variables differ across the cases as a means to explain that variation. But other modes of comparative analysis are available. In particular, Charles Tilly’s notion of encompassing comparisons – examining similarities and differences across cases while recognizing that they are inextricably connected or related to some larger whole – may be a better model for explaining long-term political processes, such as state formation, colonialism, capitalism, or even the spread of massive protests across a large number of cases. In this chapter, I develop an encompassing comparison of the Arab uprisings. The approach does not see the uprisings as individual cases whose diverse outcomes yearn for explanation but rather as instances of mass resistance to larger, transnational processes, notably including securitization and neoliberalism. This is not to suggest that these processes caused the uprisings. But the idea is to explore the ways in which the different governments were connected to these larger processes and networks and the extent to which those supranational factors help explain the outcomes of the individual cases.

During France’s turbulent ‘revolutionary century’ after 1780, historians of collective protest such as Charles Tilly and George Rudé have highlighted a crucial transformation in forms of collective protest after the mid-nineteenth century. From ‘reactive’ violence against new intrusions of the state and capitalism, food and anti-tax riots, to ‘proactive’ mobilisations through unions, election campaigns, strikes and demonstrations, these new tactics instead sought to gain influence and control over national institutions. This chapter uses several case-studies, ranging from the murder of royal officials in July 1789 to the protracted torture and burning of a noble in southwestern France in 1870, to question elements of this model. First, the transformation discerned by Tilly was neither sharp nor complete, and ‘proactive’ protest was already well in evidence at the time of the French Revolution. Second, a focus on the causes and types of violent collective behaviour has failed to analyse adequately the actual practice of violence, particularly the place of humiliation and the meanings of decapitation. Finally, however, we stress that insurgent crowds always tended towards verbal and symbolic violence – the use of threatening language, occasional destruction of property, and ritualistic action – that channelled violence within cultural limits.

In the high Middle Ages both elite kinship groups and polities became formalized, conceptually as well as legally. Since interdependence continued, there is a connection between the formalization and stabilization of elite families and the growth of more stable and durable polities. As the ruling strata of society became public, visible and relatively transparent, more durable political institutions could be formed. This chapter supports the link between formalized elite families and formalized polities. Kings and queens devoted considerable energies to ruling their realms through the nobility, for example by approving and arranging marriages. The realm depended upon magnate dynasties and their economic, military and political resources. Successful rulers collaborated with nobles. Attempts to forcibly subdue them often resulted in civil war, deposition of the monarch and even more rights for the nobility. This teaches us that collaboration, rather than coercion, is a key to polity formation.

Political scientists and historians generally consider the early modern period as the era when sovereign states appeared. Older scholarship has associated state growth with the obsolescence and defeat of the aristocracy. However, the nobility remained fundamental to the political system despite the establishment of bureaucracies and standing armies. Although the period saw a number of rebellions by nobles, kings and nobles continued to depend on each other. Far from being opposed to royal order the nobility complemented the rule of kings. Although the nobility adapted to growing state structures, this period strengthens the connection between formalization of elite families and the formalization of political institutions. This chapter shows how international politics was also dynastic politics. The internal wars of succession of the Middle Ages became international wars of succession. The chapter maps different forms of succession and their corresponding wars.