The tipping point for regime change arrives suddenly and is difficult to predict, even by those leading the revolution, as well as those leading the defense of the ruling regime. For example, at the time of regime collapse in Russia in 1917, Lenin was in Switzerland, Trotsky was in America, and Stalin was in Siberia. Like a dam that suddenly bursts as a result of the addition of a few more small drops of water, the exact moment of regime collapse is difficult to predict - even by leaders in the revolutionary movement and the forces defending the ruling regime. However, the destruction that follows the bursting of the dam is predictable. Three factors are proposed as preparing the ground for regime collapse. First, societal changes, which can be subtle, incremental, and long term. Second, changes in the ruling elite, particularly with respect to cohesion and fragmentation. Third, the emergence of a charismatic leader who takes charge of the revolutionary movement, often opportunistically putting themselves at the front of the movement.

This analysis of the psychology of revolution has adopted a “from societies to cells” approach, where macro processes are given priority. However, micro-level factors such as individual-level personality traits also have an important role in revolutions. In this chapter, an assessment is made of the personality characteristics of revolutionary leaders, people who surround the revolutionary leader, the lay masses who follow and support the extremist revolutionary leader, and those who do not conform and obey according to the wishes of the revolutionary regime. The traditional research focus has been on the revolutionary leader, and in this analysis the key traits of these leaders are identified as Machaivellianism, pathological narcissism, craving for power, risk-taking, intolerance for ambiguity, illusions of control and grandeur, and charisma. The personality of the extremist revolutionary leader in particular shapes what happens after regime change. Typically, moderates get pushed aside and extremists take over, with radical programs such as the “Cultural Revolution” (as in China and Iran).

The Argead Kingdom in Macedonia knew only primitive political institutions until the middle of the fourth century. Its Kings came from a family that had been divinely chosen and was differentiated from the rest of the population by a collective charisma. It was kept in power through its association with a Hetairoi (Companion) class, with which it socialized in symposia, which it fought with as cavalry in war, with which it hunted, sometimes for reasons of state. The royal hunt was sometimes more than a leisure activity, more than a bonding experience, and more than a preparation for war: it was one of a series of orchestrated showcases which validated and legitimized a King’s rule. In special hunts the King acted out the role of a hero, whose responsibility it was to protect all of his subjects from the forces of chaos both physical and metaphysical. As observers of the King’s prowess, the Hetairoi testified, where appropriate, to the King’s right to rule. Things began to evolve in Macedon at the end of the Peloponnesian War, but only picked up steam after the accession of Philip II. However, even as late as Alexander III, Macedonian expectations remained conservative and tradition-bound.

A specific type of nationalism developed in Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. It differed from New World nationalisms (in the tradition of George Washington, Toussaint Louverture and Simón Bolívar) in a number of respects. It was spearheaded to a large extent by writers, artists, and intellectuals (in the fields of cultural production and knowledge production) rather than by political and popular activists; as such it affected existing states and newly emergent nations alike; and its main impact was through the reconceptualization of the state, its self-image, and its institutions, rather than through popular mobilization. Its main tenet – that the state should reflect, and indeed be defined by, the ethnocultural nationality of its inhabitants – was applied in the Peace Treaties of 1919 as an overriding principle in international law (the peoples’ right to self-determination) and still informs our current assumption that the default state is the “nation-state.”

The chapter reviews the components of Mongol imperial ideology, notably the Heavenly Mandate and charisma, as well as their development, dissemination, uses, and legacies, in both steppe and sown.

This chapter provides a broad overview of existing anthropological work on exemplars and proposes a new relational way of understanding exemplarity. Most existing philosophical and anthropological work on exemplarity has taken an explicitly functionalist approach. Academics have often valued exemplars because of their ‘articulatory power’ to connect the world of things with the world of ideas. This chapter advances this conversation by examining exemplarity as a relationship between persons and things rather than an attribute of either. In doing so, the chapter explores the social effort that is required to stabilize exemplars in the world, and it shows how the creation of exemplars always goes hand in hand with scepticism and critique. Finally, the chapter investigates whether the modern world has been overcome by scepticism towards exemplars such that we now face a ‘crisis of exemplarity’ in which only ‘everyday exemplars’ can be recognized.

This chapter turns to the dynamics of democratic discontent when it seizes power, focusing on Trump but referencing other cases where relevant. It analyzes the influence of Trumpism on the left and finds a mirror image to the dynamics in Spain, where the rise of left-wing populism provoked a populist backlash among the radical right. In the United States, extreme disgust with Trump’s agenda drove many further to the left, increasing leftist Democratic discontent. The second section analyzes the final months of the Trump presidency, as its response to the Covid-19 crisis faltered and Trumpism degenerated into an arcane morass of conspiracy theories. Using experiments and observational data from the PSAS, the chapter argues that pro-Trump conspiracy theories served as a coping mechanism for his followers. As the Covid-19 crisis ravaged both the lives and livelihoods of America, and as it became increasingly clear that Trump would not be reelected, the anxiety his followers felt, regarding a situation that their loyalty to the populist prevented them from accepting, became intolerable. Conspiracy theories allowed the followers to escape anxiety and embrace resentment by giving them targets for their rage.

Chapter two details existing explanations for the surprising resilience of charismatic movements rooted in the logic of routinization and presents my alternative theory of personalistic revival. First, I discuss the logic of routinization and illustrate why this theory fails to account for the persistence of Peronism and Chavismo. Specifically, I argue that routinization overstates the ephemerality of citizens’ emotional ties to the charismatic founder and minimizes the immense difficulty of transforming the founder’s authority into a depersonalized party organization. Next, I present my theory of charismatic movement revival, in which I argue that followers’ charismatic bonds can turn into a resilient, affective identity that outlives the founder. Under sporadically occurring conditions, namely the eruption of a crisis, new leaders who portray themselves as heirs of the founder have the potential to reactivate the followers’ charismatic identity, garner support, and restore the movement to political predominance. Thus, charismatic movements can survive during periods of poor leadership and reemerge in personalistic form under more favorable circumstances. This pattern generates a cycle of political volatility that perpetuates personalistic leadership and undermines party system institutionalization.

Chapter three identifies how citizens’ charismatic attachments form, overwhelm alternative linkage types, and contribute to the development of powerful political movements. First, I describe three conditions that charismatic founders must fulfill to cultivate deep, unmediated, and emotional bonds with their followers: (1) direct recognition of these marginalized people’s suffering; (2) enactment of bold, seemingly miraculous policies; and (3) construction of a narrative that glorifies the leader’s heroic position, demonizes his opponents, and stresses his mission to transform society. Next, focusing on the Venezuelan case, I qualitatively examine how Chávez fulfilled these conditions to establish charismatic attachments with his followers. I also show how these bonds overpowered alternative linkages rooted in substantive programs and Chavista organizations. Finally, I conduct a quantitative analysis using a 2007 survey from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The results confirm the overwhelming influence of charismatic, rather than programmatic or organizational, factors on citizens’ attachments to Chavismo.

Chapter one introduces the puzzle of charismatic movement survival and proposes the explanation I advance in this book. First, I summarize the conventional wisdom, which suggests that charismatic movements must transform into institutionalized parties. Next, I present my alternative theory – that these movements can survive by sustaining, rather than discarding, their personalistic core – and argue that this new explanation better accounts for the spasmodic, stubbornly personalistic trajectories of Peronism and Chavismo. Subsequently, I introduce the multi-method research design this book uses to analyze the persistence and revival of charismatic movements in Argentina and Venezuela, which incorporates public opinion data, focus groups, and survey experiments with movement followers; interviews with leaders and political analysts; and archival research documenting each movement’s history. I then clarify and discuss the relationship between three concepts central to this book: charisma, populism, and charismatic movement. Finally, I justify my selection of the two cases of Peronism and Chavismo and lay out the organization of the book.

Chapter 3 reviews leadership as a modality of social influence. It starts by reviewing the personality approach to leadership that has predominated in psychological research over the years. This approach focusses on the identification of personality traits, such as charisma, performed in the crowd situation; a trait that successful leaders have acquired in an unclear way. This is juxtaposed by the situational approach to leadership; effective leadership is contingent on particular situations which variably call for different matching traits. Both theories are critiqued in light of normative models of leadership which account for the sticky resilience of dictatorships in various countries around the world even in the face of opportunities for instituting or restituting democracy. The chapter closes withthe social identity approach to leadership and paternalism, arguing that effective leadership is contingent on the interplay between leaders and the consent of followers.

The chapter adds to the discussion from chapter two by analyzing the roles of leaders and their ability to unleash the power of public service. The theoretical foundation for the role of leaders as visionaries and architects is examined and is complemented by a discussion of relevant empirical research. The chapter then follows two general paths to enhancing pubic service motivation through leadership. First, leaders should clearly articulate mission and vision, strengthening employee mission valence and helping them to achieve their aspirations. Further, leaders should develop leadership styles that inspire followers. Leadership styles should be authentic, but leaders can also develop their personal capacities to embrace optimal leadership strategies. Incorporating the principles of servant leadership by putting followers first and developing charisma are discussed as ways to build means-ends awareness. Leadership styles should be based around effective communication – communication that acknowledges the worth and collective efficacy of followers.

This chapter uses a famous article on the communicative features of “bullshitting” (Frankfurt 2005) to shed fresh light on select statements by Donald Trump. Frankfurt’s central observation was that in bullshitting, unlike lying, the speaker isn’t deliberately aiming to deceive and cover up the truth; rather, he can’t be bothered to care about the truth conditions of a statement. While Trump has undoubtedly told countless willful lies, some of his utterances suggest instead a predominance of bullshit. This chapter investigates Trump’s bullshit from a communicative perspective, focusing on Trump’s stance in using bullshit (in particular his desire to produce a positive self-impression) and his use of Twitter as a medium that particularly encourages bullshit in its short character bursts. Bullshitting becomes another tool in Trump’s strategy of branded entertainment, used for self-aggrandizing and to boost his impression management, to create the Trump’ spectacle, and to test others’ loyalty.