This study examines gender differences in inflation expectations, attitudes and responses using the UK Inflation Attitudes Survey. It finds minimal gender disparity in inflation perceptions and expectations but highlights greater uncertainty and inflation aversion among women. During inflationary periods, women are more likely to increase savings, whereas men typically push for higher wages. Gender gaps in financial knowledge and trust in the Bank of England (BoE) suggest tailored communication strategies may enhance engagement. While BoE policies effectively anchor expectations, improved outreach and diverse messaging could address women’s lower satisfaction and financial understanding. The findings underscore the role of inclusivity in effective monetary communication.

This paper investigates the bidirectional relation between the Brazilian Central Bank communication and the yield curve. Using latent factors, observable macroeconomic variables, and observable variables representing Central Bank communication, we estimate a model that summarizes the yield curve. We find evidence of the effects of Brazilian Central Bank communication on the movements of the yield curve and the impact of the yield curve components in Brazilian Central Bank communication. In particular, Central Bank communication can shape yield curve curvature and slope. Additionally, we find a strong relation between Central Bank communication and the curvature of the yield curve. These results show that Central Bank communication impacts market players, making it a valuable instrument for monetary policy.

To be effective, central bankers must project expertise and an anti-inflation commitment. However, those attributes are usually male-coded, which may undermine female central bankers. We assess gender bias using a survey experiment fielded in Japan in September 2022, when, for the first time in decades, the Bank of Japan appeared to struggle with inflation. We exposed individuals to simplified Bank of Japan communication and randomly assigned attribution to male (Mr. Adachi) or female (Ms. Nakagawa) Policy Board members. Respondents trusted the Bank of Japan less and were more sceptical of its capacity to handle inflation when Ms. Nakagawa represented it.

We use laboratory experiments with human subjects to test the relevance of different inflation-targeting regimes. In particular and within the standard New Keynesian model, we evaluate to what extent communication of the inflation target is relevant to the success of inflation targeting. We find that if the central bank cares only about inflation stabilization, announcing the inflation target does not make a difference in terms of macroeconomic performance compared with a standard active monetary policy. However, if the central bank also cares about the stabilization of economic activity, communicating the target helps to reduce the volatility of inflation, interest rate, and output gap, although their average levels are not affected. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature and provides a rationale for the adoption of a flexible inflation-targeting regime.