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Individuals can rationally pursue their interests without the preferences and marginal utilities that have long taken center stage in economics. Economics without preferences lays out the microeconomics of individual behavior, markets, and welfare when agents cannot always come to judgment. Although economic theory has claimed that self-interest requires agents to form preferences, individuals can protect themselves from harm by refusing to trade options they cannot rank. Many of the anomalies uncovered by behavioral economics – from status quo bias to loss aversion – thus have a rationality design. The absence of preferences also resolves the puzzle that classical economic agents are almost never indifferent between options whereas real-world agents often are. When individuals cannot judge trade-offs, gaps appear between the marginal valuations of gains and losses. These gaps explain why market prices can be volatile and render orthodox efficiency criteria indecisive. Policymakers will no longer be able to pin down an optimal provision of public goods. Traditional schemes that try to harness preference information to compensate agents harmed by economic change will allow virtually any decision to qualify as efficient. Governments should instead spur productivity growth, the main benefit capitalism can deliver, while shielding agents from the price upheavals that result.
The chapter critically examines the intersection of economics and politics, particularly in the context of behavioral economics challenging traditional economic models. Ezrahi highlights Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman’s reception by economists, revealing their discomfort with the implications of irrationality and cognitive biases in economic decision-making. The emergence of behavioral economics threatens the perceived objectivity of economists and their claims to enhance rationality in public affairs. The chapter explores how economists striving for professional objectivity, akin to natural sciences, inadvertently align with political and cultural biases. It contends that economics' influence on politics and policy arises from portraying the market as a natural, objective force detached from political interests. The chapter traces the historical evolution of economics, highlighting its separation from explicit moral and political considerations, leading to a focus on abstract models. It contends that economics wields significant influence, acting as both a check on over politicized governance and a veil concealing political choices. The chapter concludes by advocating for a return to political economics, acknowledging and addressing the political dimensions inherent in economic decisions.
Economics without Preferences lays out a new microeconomics – a theory of choice behavior, markets, and welfare – for agents who lack the preferences and marginal judgments that economics normally relies on. Agents without preferences defy the rules of the traditional model of rational choice but they can still systematically pursue their interests. The theory that results resolves several puzzles in economics. Status quo bias and other anomalies of behavioral economics shield agents from harm; they are expressions rather than violations of rationality. Parts of economic orthodoxy go out the window. Agents will fail to make the fine-grained trade-offs ingrained in conventional economics, leading market prices to be volatile and cost-benefit analysis to break down. This book provides policy alternatives to fill this void. Governments can spur innovation, the main benefit markets can deliver, while sheltering agents from the upheavals that accompany economic change.
While laboratory and field experiments are the major items in the toolbox of behavioral economists, household panel studies can complement them and expand their research potential. We introduce the German Socio-Economic Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS), which offers researchers detailed panel data and the possibility to collect personalized experimental and survey data for free. We discuss what SOEP-IS can offer to behavioral economists and illustrate a set of design ideas with examples. Although we build our discussion on SOEP-IS, our purpose is to provide a guide that can be generalized to other household panel studies as well.
Loss framing and checklist formatting are two oft-cited tools for encouraging behavior change, but there is little causal evidence on their impact in field settings. We partnered with the City of Philadelphia to test the effectiveness of these tools to increase completion of the City’s wellness program. In our experiment, 5235 City employees and retirees were randomly assigned to receive one of four postcard versions (using a 2 × 2 design), whereby we varied both framing (gain or loss) and how instructions were provided (information only or information in checklist format). Our results suggest that neither loss framing nor the checklist formatting significantly influenced the likelihood that individuals would complete the wellness tasks, or how quickly they completed the tasks. We conclude that this specific form of employee behavior may be difficult to influence through the “passive” behavioral interventions we tested, and suggest that a more “active” approach may be required in such instances.
We have previously argued thatbehavioral scientists have been testing and advocating individualistic (i-frame) solutions to policy problems that have systemic (s-frame) causes and require systemic solutions. Here, we consider the implications of adopting an s-frame approach for research. We argue that an s-frame approach will involve addressing different types of questions, which will, in turn, require a different toolbox of research methods.
Traditional approaches for evaluating the impact of scientific research – mainly scholarship (i.e., publications, presentations) and grant funding – fail to capture the full extent of contributions that come from larger scientific initiatives. The Translational Science Benefits Model (TSBM) was developed to support more comprehensive evaluations of scientific endeavors, especially research designed to translate scientific discoveries into innovations in clinical or public health practice and policy-level changes. Here, we present the domains of the TSBM, including how it was expanded by researchers within the Implementation Science Centers in Cancer Control (ISC3) program supported by the National Cancer Institute. Next, we describe five studies supported by the Penn ISC3, each focused on testing implementation strategies informed by behavioral economics to reduce key practice gaps in the context of cancer care and identify how each study yields broader impacts consistent with TSBM domains. These indicators include Capacity Building, Methods Development (within the Implementation Field) and Rapid Cycle Approaches, implementing Software Technologies, and improving Health Care Delivery and Health Care Accessibility. The examples highlighted here can help guide other similar scientific initiatives to conceive and measure broader scientific impact to fully articulate the translation and effects of their work at the population level.
This chapter provides an overview of the purpose of the book, namely to help the user of public opinion data develop a systematic analytical approach for understanding, predicting, and engaging public opinion. This includes helping the reader understand how public opinion can be employed as a decision-making input, meaning a factor, or variable, to assess, predict, or influence an outcome. The chapter outlines how information from different disciplines, including cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and political science, come together to inform the pollster’s work.
Predictions often falter because of human error. Most misses have much more to do with our own human shortcomings than with the technical sophistication of the method at hand. In our experience, forecasting errors occur when we discard or misinterpret evidence right in front of us. The clues are there, but we are blinded by our own filters. This is why it is essential to tackle such biases and discuss corresponding solutions. In this chapter, we’ll look at studies on the forecasting prowess of experts. Then, we’ll focus on cognitive biases that skew predictions. Finally, we’ll present an applied approach to minimize such biases.
Effectuation has become the basis for educating entrepreneurs and managers. Derived from cognitive and behavioral economic studies of expert entrepreneurs, effectuation shows how to cocreate value in highly uncertain situations. The framework of effectuation consists in techniques that minimize the use of predictive information and ways to turn control itself into strategy. In doing so, the effectual process opens up radically new ways to rethink a variety of fundamental concepts in all the social sciences. This ranges from risk and return to markets and governments in economics; attitudes toward ends and means in psychology; opportunism and altruism in social psychology; and even success and failure in strategic management. Effectuation theory inverts several older approaches in what Herbert Simon referred to as the 'sciences of the artificial'. These inversions suggest an entrepreneurial method based on non-predictive control that complements the predictive control techniques of the scientific method.
Recent meta-analyses suggest that certain drugs act as cognitive enhancers and can increase attentional investment and performance even for healthy adults. The current review examines the potential of behavioral economics enhancers (BEEs) for similarly improving cognitive performance and judgments. Traditionally, behavioral economics theory has adopted a skeptical approach regarding the notion of whether individuals can overcome judgment biases through variables that increase cognitive effort. We focus mostly on the effects of two BEEs: incentivization and losses. Summarizing results from different meta-analyses, we find a small but robust positive effect size for BEEs, with comparable effect sizes to those found in studies of pharmacological cognitive enhancers.
Recent work has argued for a Hayekian behavioural economics, which combines Austrian economics with behavioural economics as developed by Kahneman, Thaler, Sunstein, and others. We suggest that this hybrid is misguided because it relies on individual cognitivism. This view of cognition is incompatible with the Hayekian view of cognition which treats rationality as an emergent phenomenon of social interaction in an institutional environment. This Hayekian view, which we call epistemic institutionalism, is compatible with an alternative prominent perspective in psychology, that of the extended mind, sometimes known as 4E cognition. We demonstrate how the Hayekian perspective on individualism, the price system, and the evolution of rules can be connected to the extended mind programme, through concepts such as the coupling of the individual and their environment, cognitive off-loading, and affordances. We suggest that this alternative combination of Austrian economics and psychology provides a more fruitful way forward, especially because it foregrounds the processes of learning, error-correction, and institutional orders, rather than choice, bias, and individual rationality. To explain why Austrian economists have been receptive to behavioural economics, we distinguish epistemic institutionalism from the (radical) subjectivist approach, which shares key assumptions of individual cognitivism.
Chapter 3 links context-dependent choice with what has recently been called in economics the “reconciliation problem” between positive and normative economics, and argues that efforts to solve that problem have led to a number of different strategies for reconstructing economics’ individual conception. It first reviews the mainstream’s “inner rational agent” attempt to preserve Homo economicus and then contrasts two broad strategies for reconstructing economics’ individual conception based on opposing views of individual autonomy: an “internalist” view that makes it depend on private subjectivity, and an “externalist” view that makes it depend on economic and social institutions. The chapter reviews four, recent strategies in the literature which take the “externalist” view and move toward a socially embedded individual conception. All four make ability to adjust part of what people are, but all four remain attached to the idea that individuals are only made up of preferences. Thus, I argue they fail to explain how people are autonomous individuals able to choose and act freely.
In Chapter 1, we set out the big question that this book seeks to answer: How does economics help us understand the various relationships between human beings and dogs? We label our effort to answer this big question and the many related economic questions and issues as “dogonomics.” To frame the question, we introduce two somewhat differing economic perspectives: neoclassical economics, which assumes individual rationality, and behavioral economics, which argues that people act irrationally in predictable ways. We make the case that, although many dogs are bought and sold in markets, they are unlike other commodities and most other animals. Dog exceptionalism is real. Indeed, they often have a dual nature as both commodity and family member.
Chapter 2 shows the falseness of two ideas that underlie the central elements of privacy law: that people make fully rational privacy choices and that they don’t care about their privacy. These notions create a dissonance between law and reality, which prevents laws from providing meaningful privacy protections. Contrary to rationality, context has an outsized impact on our privacy decisions and we can’t understand what risks are involved in our privacy “choices,” particularly with AI inferences. The notion that we’re apathetic is prevalent in popular discourse about how much people share online and the academic literature about “the privacy paradox.” Dismantling the myth of apathy shows there’s no privacy paradox. People simply face uncertainty and unknowable risks. People make privacy choices in a context of anti-privacy design, such as dark patterns. In this process, we’re manipulated by corporations, who are more aware of our biases than regulators are.
Chapter 4 delves into two efforts to reinforce consent: opt-in and informed choice. It illustrates why, in the information economy, they also fail. Power asymmetries enable systemic manipulation in the design of digital products and services. Manipulation by design thwarts improved consent provisions, interfering with people’s decision-making. People’s choices regarding their privacy are determined by the designs of the systems with which they interact. European and American attempts to regulate manipulation by changing tracking from ‘opt-out’ to ‘opt-in’ and reinforcing information crash on the illusion of consent. Contract law doctrines that aim to reduce manipulation are unsuitable because they assume mutually beneficial agreements, and privacy policies are neither. Best efforts to strengthen meaningful consent and choice, even where policies are specifically intended to protect users, ultimately are insufficient because of the environment in which privacy “decisions” take place.
Delay discounting—the extent to which individuals show a preference for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards—has been proposed as a transdiagnostic neurocognitive process across mental health conditions, but its examination in relation to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is comparatively recent. To assess the aggregated evidence for elevated delay discounting in relation to posttraumatic stress, we conducted a meta-analysis on existing empirical literature. Bibliographic searches identified 209 candidate articles, of which 13 articles with 14 independent effect sizes were eligible for meta-analysis, reflecting a combined sample size of N = 6897. Individual study designs included case-control (e.g. examination of differences in delay discounting between individuals with and without PTSD) and continuous association studies (e.g. relationship between posttraumatic stress symptom severity and delay discounting). In a combined analysis of all studies, the overall relationship was a small but statistically significant positive association between posttraumatic stress and delay discounting (r = .135, p < .0001). The same relationship was statistically significant for continuous association studies (r = .092, p = .027) and case-control designs (r = .179, p < .001). Evidence of publication bias was minimal. The included studies were limited in that many did not concurrently incorporate other psychiatric conditions in the analyses, leaving the specificity of the relationship to posttraumatic stress less clear. Nonetheless, these findings are broadly consistent with previous meta-analyses of delayed reward discounting in relation to other mental health conditions and provide further evidence for the transdiagnostic utility of this construct.
Behavioral economics has become a dominant set of theories in explaining economic behavior, yet such behavior remains under the limited purview of psychological, cognitive, or neural approaches. This article draws on and extends Viviana Zelizer's social meaning of money framework in conjunction with new work in ‘relational accounting’ to suggest a sociological counterpoint, focusing in particular on the social and symbolic meaning attached to individual 401(k) retirement accounts. Following a market downturn, neoclassical and behavioral economics predict various types of behavioral responses, in particular loss aversion - where investors seek to increase risk-taking rather than locking in a sure loss (a loss is more painful to bear than an equivalent gain). A sociological theory that understands the shared meaning of retirement saving would predict something different, a behavior I call durable conservatism. In this article, I show how this concept better explains observed risk behavior in Americans’ 401(k) accounts following the 2002 and 2008 bear markets in stocks, and how that response differed from the behavior documented in non-retirement brokerage accounts.
As economists took up the task of measuring the demand for environmental services not traded in markets, some chose to substituted survey-based methods known as contingent valuation (CV). Doing so, they could not help but find themselves in the uncomfortable position of self-evidently constructing their observations rather than merely observing them. Apparent anomalies between the constructs and the predictions for economic man led to a fierce debate over the merits of contingent valuation--a debate that hinged on the question of whether economic theory was being applied or tested.
Why are take up rates incomplete or low when the relevant opportunities are unambiguously advantageous to people who are eligible for them? How can public officials promote higher take up of opportunities? All over the world, these are challenges of the first order. There are three primary barriers to take up: learning costs, compliance costs, and psychological costs. These costs lower the net expected benefit of opportunities, and reduce participation in otherwise advantageous programs. Fully rational agents would consider these costs in their take up decisions, and in light of behavioral biases, such costs loom especially large and may seem prohibitive. Experimental and other evidence suggest methods for reducing the barriers to take up and the effects of behavioral biases. Use of such methods has the potential to significantly increase access to a wide range of opportunities that would increase individual well-being and social welfare.