We propose a stock market model with chartists, fundamentalists and market makers. Chartists chase stock price trends, fundamentalists bet on mean reversion, and market makers adjust stock prices to reflect current excess demand. Fundamentalists’ perception of the stock market’s fundamental value is subject to animal spirits. As long as the stock market is relatively stable, fundamentalists neutrally believe in a normal fundamental value. However, fundamentalists optimistically (pessimistically) believe in a high (low) fundamental value when the stock market rises (falls) sharply. Our framework may produce boom-bust stock market dynamics that coevolve with waves of optimism and pessimism for parameter settings that would ensure globally stable stock market dynamics in the absence of animal spirits. Responsible for such a surprising outcome is the destabilizing nature of temporarily attracting virtual fixed points, brought about by animal spirits.

Economists have long been interested in the effect of business sentiment on economic activity. Using text analysis, I construct a new company-level indicator of sentiment based on the net balance of positive and negative words in Australian company disclosures. Company-level investment is very sensitive to changes in this corporate sentiment indicator, even controlling for fundamentals, such as Tobin’s Q, as well as controlling for measures of company-level uncertainty.

The high sensitivity of investment to sentiment could be due to several mechanisms. It could be because of animal spirits among managers or because of sentiment proxies for private information held by managers about company prospects. Overall, I find mixed evidence of the underlying causal mechanism. The effect of sentiment on investment is relatively persistent, which is consistent with managers having private information about company fundamentals. But the sensitivity of investment to sentiment is not any stronger at opaque companies in which managers are likely to be better informed than investors. Further, investment is sensitive to sentiment even when investors have an information advantage over managers by lagging the sentiment indicator by a year. Overall, the sensitivity of investment to sentiment appears to reflect both animal spirits and fundamentals.

Corporate investment has been weak since the global financial crisis (GFC) and demand-side factors, such as lower sales growth, explain more than half of this weakness. Low sentiment and heightened uncertainty weighed on investment during the GFC but have been less important factors since then.

In this paper, we make the case that an argument for price-level targeting over inflation targeting need not to be based on some overly restrictive assumptions. We adopt a theoretical framework that deviates from the assumption of rational expectation, and that takes into account the cognitive limitations and a “trial and error” learning mechanism of the agents. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict consumer price index (CPI) inflation targeting, exchange rate peg, and domestic price-level and CPI-level targeting) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxing the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy planning. We find that price-level targeting prevails over inflation targeting even under different expectation formation and even when the announced inflation target is not fully credible. The counterfactual analysis and sensitivity test confirm that CPI-level targeting is the most effective for improving social welfare and stability in an open economy. The business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting.

Multiple-equilibria macroeconomic models suggest that consumers' and investors' perceptions about the state of the economy may be important independent factors for business cycles. In this paper, we verify empirically the interrelations between waves of optimism and pessimism and subsequent economic fluctuations. We focus on the behavior of nonfundamental movements in the consumer sentiment index, as a proxy for consumers' sunspots, and in the business formation index, representing investors' animal spirits, around economic turning points. We find that bearish consumers and entrepreneurs were present before the onset of some U.S. economic downturns, sometimes even when the fundamentals were all very strong. In particular, our analysis shows that self-fulfilling pessimism may have played a nontrivial role in the 1969–1970, the 1973–1975, and the 1981–1982 recessions. The results are robust to a range of alternative linear and nonlinear specifications. Our evidence provides some empirical support for the role of nonfundamental rational expectations in economic fluctuations.