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all-pay auctions

Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review (1)

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A Class of All-pay Auctions with Affiliated Information
Gian Luigi Albano
Journal:

Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review / Volume 67 / Issue 1 / 2001

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

17 August 2016, pp. 31-38

Print publication:

2001
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We study an auction mechanism combining the war of attrition and the all-pay auction under the assumption that buyers’ signals are affiliated. We provide a sufficient condition which guarantees the existence of a symmetric, increasing equilibrium bidding strategy, but rules out full extraction of buyers’ surplus by the seller. We develop revenue comparison between the combined mechanism, the war of attrition and the all-pay auction.