The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is a valuable case study in the coercive use of air power. Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign demonstrates the danger of employing a punishment approach against a subnational actor in a multi-sided internal conflict. Strategies of collective punishment, blockade, and decapitation have all malfunctioned against a stubborn and resilient Houthi adversary. The early audit from Yemen endorses a denial strategy, supports the growing orthodoxy that air attack is most effectively applied in support of ground forces, and offers insight on the relative utility of interdiction and close air support for that purpose. The Saudi-led coalition’s performance also underscores how difficult it is to achieve positive objectives with proxy warfare, regardless of air support. This chapter dissects the campaign, assesses its effectiveness, and draws lessons about air power’s ability to influence the outcome of similar complex civil war scenarios elsewhere.

NATO’s 1999 air campaign over Kosovo represents a rare example of a purely coercive air power campaign. Most coercive air campaigns are combined with a ground element, making it difficult to empirically distinguish the specific role played by air power. In Operation Allied Force, though, the prospect of a ground campaign was discussed and no meaningful ground threat materialized. There is also little evidence that Slobodan Milosevic perceived NATO was seeking to generate a threat of invasion. Accordingly, this is an unusual case of a significant military campaign that led to a successful outcome relying on air power alone. NATO did not plan for the campaign to last as long as it did, nor were plans in place that would have guaranteed the Western alliance’s desired outcome. Nevertheless, the campaign achieved NATO’s primary goals. It thus represents an example of a purely coercive military strategy leading to a successful result.

Air power played a central, if uneven, role in the US military response to the September 11 attacks during Operation Enduring Freedom. For many, the successes of the air campaign in Afghanistan heralded a “New American Way of War” – a strategy characterized by the precise application of long-range air power, ISR support, and special forces coordinating with local allies against the enemy. However, air operations over Afghanistan generated mixed levels of effectiveness against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, with success often tempered by the degree and quality of teaming between air and ground components. This chapter explores the legacy of air power during Operation Enduring Freedom, carefully examining the origins and context of the air campaign, key characteristics and events of air operations throughout the conflict, whether air power in Afghanistan ultimately proved effective, and finally how applicable the experiences of the air campaign might be for future conflicts.

Moscow’s air power success in Syria presents an opportunity to assess Russian inter- and intra-war adaptation in kinetic counterinsurgency. New technologies and tactics have enhanced the Russian Aerospace Force’s battlefield lethality and resilience but have not yet triggered a fundamental transition in operating concept. Russia’s air force has yet to actualize a reconnaissance-strike regime or advanced air-ground integration. Instead, situational and strategic factors appear to be more powerful contributors to its superior performance in the Syrian conflict. The way in which Russia has chosen to leverage its improvements in accurate munitions delivery, moreover, highlights key differences between its warfighting philosophy and that embraced by major Western powers. The resultant findings provide insight into Moscow’s coercive campaign logic, force-planning imperatives, and the likelihood that it might re-export the Syria model elsewhere.

Chapter 2 analyzes the ideas of the airpower theorist William (Billy) Mitchell. It describes his life and his "America," which in the words of period novelist, F. Scott Fitzgerald, was "careless and confused." Mitchell, like his America, pursued his goals aggressively regardless of the consequences. This chapter also discusses how Jominian first principles – concentration, offensive action, and decision by battle – figured in Mitchell’s thinking. It ends by explaining how Mitchell’s model of war’s nature was essentially the same as Mahan’s, the traditional model.