Book contents
- Air Power in the Age of Primacy
- Air Power in the Age of Primacy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Air Power in the Age of Primacy
- 2 Remote Warfare: A New Architecture of Air Power
- 3 Deliberate Force: Ambivalent Success
- 4 Hoping for Victory: Coercive Air Power and NATO’s Strategy in Kosovo
- 5 Operation Enduring Freedom
- 6 The Result Is Never Final: Operation Iraqi Freedom
- 7 Israeli Air Force Effectiveness during the Second Lebanon War (2006)
- 8 Libya 2011: Hollow Victory in Low-Cost Air War
- 9 Coercing a Chaos State: The Saudi-Led Air War in Yemen
- 10 Russia’s Air War Win in Syria
- 11 Air Power in the Battle of Mosul
- 12 Retrospect and Prospect: Air Power in the Age of Primacy and Beyond
- Index
4 - Hoping for Victory: Coercive Air Power and NATO’s Strategy in Kosovo
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2021
- Air Power in the Age of Primacy
- Air Power in the Age of Primacy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Air Power in the Age of Primacy
- 2 Remote Warfare: A New Architecture of Air Power
- 3 Deliberate Force: Ambivalent Success
- 4 Hoping for Victory: Coercive Air Power and NATO’s Strategy in Kosovo
- 5 Operation Enduring Freedom
- 6 The Result Is Never Final: Operation Iraqi Freedom
- 7 Israeli Air Force Effectiveness during the Second Lebanon War (2006)
- 8 Libya 2011: Hollow Victory in Low-Cost Air War
- 9 Coercing a Chaos State: The Saudi-Led Air War in Yemen
- 10 Russia’s Air War Win in Syria
- 11 Air Power in the Battle of Mosul
- 12 Retrospect and Prospect: Air Power in the Age of Primacy and Beyond
- Index
Summary
NATO’s 1999 air campaign over Kosovo represents a rare example of a purely coercive air power campaign. Most coercive air campaigns are combined with a ground element, making it difficult to empirically distinguish the specific role played by air power. In Operation Allied Force, though, the prospect of a ground campaign was discussed and no meaningful ground threat materialized. There is also little evidence that Slobodan Milosevic perceived NATO was seeking to generate a threat of invasion. Accordingly, this is an unusual case of a significant military campaign that led to a successful outcome relying on air power alone. NATO did not plan for the campaign to last as long as it did, nor were plans in place that would have guaranteed the Western alliance’s desired outcome. Nevertheless, the campaign achieved NATO’s primary goals. It thus represents an example of a purely coercive military strategy leading to a successful result.
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- Information
- Air Power in the Age of PrimacyAir Warfare since the Cold War, pp. 76 - 96Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021