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Chapter 6 turns to the subject of 'private enforcement', which in East Asia is uneven and inadequate. It discusses this through the lens of ‘litigation culture’, or rather the culture of non-litigiousness. Claims of non-litigiousness in East Asia, and above all in Japan, have been fiercely contested by scholars. Yet the subject is nuanced; the impact of non-adversarialism has not simply been ‘debunked’. In the context of this debate, the chapter examines factors that have limited the development of consumer antitrust claims. Consistent with the value of social harmony and the ancient authoritarianism that prioritizes social stability, methods of mediation and conciliation have been favoured over court conflict. Under the influence of this tradition, private parties have often been encouraged to settle their differences. Deviating from this tradition, the chapter highlights Korea, where recent legislative developments are producing, at least on paper, stronger litigation incentives. Overall, the view is expressed that, where cultural factors contribute to non-adversarialism, thereby leading to a deficit in the vindication of private claims, it appears that cultural messaging and a shift in norms may assist in unlocking the potential of legal and procedural reforms that reduce institutional barriers and activate economic incentives.
In legal procedures, sanction is understood as a means to put a law into effect, by which the legal subject is compelled to comply with the law by providing incentives for compliance or penalties for infringement. To be effective, sanction needs to have a deterrent effect on the wrongdoer. Competition law sanction varies in different jurisdictions and may include rules of an administrative, private, and criminal law nature. In Indonesia, the competition authority can impose administrative sanctions. However, the law also provides for criminal sanction for the infringement, for which it requires a court decision. The law itself does not mention private sanctions. In practice, it is debatable whether it would be possible to claim damages from a competition law infringer via court. The study is divided into two parts. First, it focuses on sanctioning in competition law in Indonesia: while sanctions usually require a deterrent effect, two issues need further clarification. Secondly, it addresses the challenges needing to be overcome to establish an ASEAN competition law and ASEAN competition law enforcement body, and the attempts to harmonize competition laws of member countries.
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