Earlier papers, based on a computer model of European air traffic, deal with the probability of conflicts arising between pairs of aircraft operating under free-flight rules. This paper discusses the problems of resolving these conflicts. When a potential collision takes place in the neighbourhood of other intruding aircraft, these must be taken into account when choosing an escape manoeuvre. A suggestion is made that may ease the problem.

Traditionally, the duties of a lookout include maintaining situational awareness and providing warning of the risk of collision, stranding and other dangers to navigation. Therefore, in addition to the use of both eyesight and hearing, the effective use of available instruments and equipment are essential to the purpose of proper lookout; this applies particularly to radar. The aim of this paper is to emphasise the need for the correct practice and method of lookout.

This paper was first presented at the NAV99/ILA28 Conference on ‘Loran-C, Satellite and Integrated Systems for the 21st Century’ held at Church House, Westminster, London from 1–3 November 1999.

The introduction of modern navigation systems highlights the need for efficient tools to assess the possible impact of these systems on the safety levels currently associated with the operation of a ship. In recent years this has led to investigation of the advanced safety/risk assessment techniques already applied in other industrial sectors, with encouraging results. The scope of this paper is to show a quantified safety assessment methodology that can be applied while designing or retrofitting navigation systems. The methodology adopted is the result of the review of the IMO Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) technique and comprises the development of a functional analysis, a hazard identification analysis and a risk assessment. The paper provides details on a specific application of this model to an integrated navigation system. This application is included in the work performed under the ATOMOS II research project, partly funded by the DGVII Directorate of the European Commission within the 4th Framework Programme in the field of Maritime Transport.

This, and the following three papers, were first presented at GNSS 2000, the Third European Symposium on Global Navigation Satellite Systems held in Edinburgh, Scotland from 1st to 4th May 2000.

This paper presents the methodology and a practical implementation approach to perform GNSS Safety Assessment and Certification with due consideration of the satellite navigation system users. It places Galileo GNSS in a total system that includes vehicles, on-board equipment, crews and traffic controllers and defines the necessary organisation for implementing safety analyses right from the early design phases of navigation systems. Civil aviation has very demanding requirements based on objectives for air navigation safety. It is much better organised on a worldwide basis than other GNSS users and is considered in this paper as the leading study case. Some methods are then proposed to build a bridge between all user organisations and to set up a common approach to certification.

This paper discusses the design, development and operation of two tools intended for B-RNAV operations: the enhanced AUGUR system, which was commissioned by EUROCONTROL, and the Global Positioning System (GPS) Performance Monitoring System (GPMS), commissioned by National Air Traffic Services Ltd. (NATS). Both tools were implemented by STASYS Ltd., with support from Delft University on AUGUR algorithm issues. AUGUR, a Predictive GPS Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) system, performs complex calculations and provides an easy-to-interpret Internet-based interface to aid aircraft operators with the use of GPS. Enhancements to AUGUR have been implemented to meet user requests and the requirements of a future Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) Temporary Guidance Leaflet (TGL) on the airworthiness and operational approval for the use of Area Navigation (RNAV) systems in European airspace designated for Precision RNAV (P-RNAV) operations. The GPMS records output from a variety of GPS UE, has a real-time interface, performs simulations based on logged data, and permits remote analysis. The work carried out consisted of specifying a system to meet the safety study recommendations, choosing hardware, analysing interface requirements, and developing systems and software. These tools are now in place to help with GPS B-RNAV operations, and provide a layer of safety for both en-route flight and GPS-based non-precision approach operations in European airspace.

Operating a fleet of ships in all weathers and environments poses certain risks, and navigational incidents such as collisions, groundings and vessel strikings are bound to occur. The Royal Navy has always conducted extensive inquiries into the serious navigational incidents in order to establish the cause and so prevent reoccurrence. However, many less serious navigational incidents occur which, if collated and analysed on a database, could help better understanding of the nature of such incidents. This paper describes how a database that met these needs was designed and developed. Once completed, the database was analysed to compare trends between different vessel types and incident categories.

In an earlier study, the author attempted to give some quantitative estimates of the problems that free flow might face in Europe. The study was based on a traffic sample from the Eurocontrol Route Charges Office for a busy day in 1991. More recently, they generously made available a similar sample for a day in 1997. Using this new data, the study has been extended to cover wider aspects of the free flow problem. The central problem is that of ensuring safety. This will require a mechanism to detect collision threats and safely to resolve the problems. Possible tools are ground-based surveillance and/or airborne systems. This paper will use computer modelling to predict the loads that these detection and resolution systems must face.

This paper considers the issue of operating aircraft through the North Atlantic's Minimum Navigation Performance Specification (MNPS) airspace. Noting that aircraft constantly strive for reduced fuel burn and uplift, it describes how flight operators and pilots conduct safe, efficient flights through the region. Reference is made to mechanisms of the North Atlantic MNPS airspace in terms of its Organized Track Structure and other routes that exist. These different structures emphasize the level of flexibility available. Flight planning procedures and requirements necessary to obtain oceanic Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearances are mentioned, as is an account of how communication and position reporting procedures operate to apply the Mach Number technique. Other aspects of MNPS operations such as ETOPS operational restrictions, meteorological effects, the employment of Reduced Vertical Separation Minima and planned regional changes aim to provide an overview of the MNPS system's current and future air traffic management.

The present-day emphasis on the need to analyse and identify risk situations in ports is hardly a new phenomenon. In fact, port managements have, as a matter of course, been very conscious of this need but over the years, with the ever-increasing transport by sea of hazardous hydrocarbon, chemical as well as nuclear-related products, this need has simply become much more pronounced. Moreover, present-day public awareness and concern about the possible incident impact on the environment in the form of pollution or personal injury has even further increased the awareness of the corporate responsibility and the need to assess the operational risk levels of ports. Of equal importance, of course, is the need and the capability to predict operational risk levels for new port developments or modification projects or of the possible risks associated with the introduction of hazardous cargo-handling facilities at existing or new port terminals.