Through computational-assisted analysis of the Weibo corpus of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) spanning from 2013 to 2020, this paper unveils the strategic utilization of fandom culture by the CYL, the youth wing of the ruling party, in its nationalistic propaganda on the internet. Specifically, the CYL deliberately associates with the pop idols of the younger generation on Weibo, harnessing their influence to promote nationalistic content that encompasses both “pride-oriented” and “hostility-oriented” themes. Subsequent analysis reveals a greater propensity for nationalistic content to generate audience response compared to other types of content, particularly when endorsed by these pop idols. This research enriches our understanding of the CYL's propaganda efforts and contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on “soft propaganda” in China.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regards the Communist Youth League (CYL) as a critical and distinctive mass organization that acts as an “assistant” and “reserve army” for the Party. This article uses the analytical concepts of historical institutionalism and critical junctures to discuss the changes in the CYL during the post-Mao period. We focus on two critical junctures: 1982, when the CYL became a route to rapid promotion for cadres, and 2016, after which its cadres had fewer opportunities for promotion and the CYL was pushed back to its original role in youth United Front work. We also find that the CYL has refined its United Front methods to attract talented young people by offering them services. This reflects the efforts of the CCP regime to adapt to circumstances and ensure its survival.

How can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.