The relative dynamism of English and Scottish foreign trade from 1675 to 1775 can largely be explained by the interrelated phenomena of the growing domestic demand for American and Asian consumer goods and North European raw materials; the growing market in northern and western Europe for re-exports of American and Asian consumables; and the growing protected market for British manufactures in the American colonies and Africa. Trade growth depended on development of a wide variety of credit practices, supported primarily by big wholesalers and export merchants. Wholesalers and merchants also accounted for important institutional innovations.

The article studies the evolution of the constitutional arrangements in seventeenth-century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It focuses on the relationship between institutions and the behavior of the government and interprets the institutional changes on the basis of the goals of the winners—secure property rights, protection of their wealth, and the elimination of confiscatory government. We argue that the new institutions allowed the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights. Their success was remarkable, as the evidence from capital markets shows.

The fiscal policy accomplishments of the ancien régime during its last two decades in France have been greatly underappreciated. While the collapse of the monarchy has been attributed to persistent peacetime deficits, these did not appear until the mid-1780s when earlier reforms and successful budget policies were abandoned by reactionary finance ministers. Had the earlier policies been continued, it is unlikely that a severe crisis would have occurred in 1788/89.

The article develops a model of gold-standard efficiency in the context of the theory of efficient asset markets. Efficiency is measured by the ratio of experienced disutility to the hypothetical loss under perfect gold arbitrage and neutral exchange-rate speculation. Dollar-sterling gold-point estimates for 1890 to 1906 are generated using the methodology of focusing on the dominant arbitrageurs, the prevailing exchange instrument, and the primary form of gold shipped. Gold- standard efficiency is remarkably high and only marginally below exchange- market efficiency from 1950 to 1966 under Bretton Woods.

This article estimates biases to technical change in Canadian manufacturing from 1900 to 1929, and compares these to estimates of biased technical change in U.S. manufacturing. Significant differences are found between similar industries in the two countries, indicating that Canadian manufacturers did not use U.S. technology in unaltered fashion, but adapted it to be more cost efficient under Canadian factor market conditions.

This article examines a government-sponsored cartel that fixed domestic crude oil prices in interstate markets from 1933 through 1972. Although the cartel raised and stabilized nominal oil prices beyond earlier private efforts, it also resulted in politically driven constraints on price, output levels, and cartel rent distribution. Political factors molded quota assignments, diverted production from low- to high-cost producers, and raised production costs. Political pressures prevented Texas from acting as a residual or swing producer. Instead, the interstate oil cartel members maintained nominal prices and spread the political costs of output adjustments.

Like many land-abundant, labor-scarce economies, Thailand had a well-developed system of property rights in man. Over the nineteenth century corvée and slavery were abolished and replaced by military conscription, a head tax, and more precise property rights in land. Concomitant trends included extensive commercialization, the growth of international trade, imperialist threats to Thai sovereignty, and the growth of a centralized unitary state. Both domestic and international political motives influenced monarchs in the abolition of human-property rights. Economic change greatly facilitated these institutional changes.

Analysis of the spatial pattern of prices and output in the manuscript returns of the French agricultural census of 1852 indicates that the availability of market outlets was probably the dominant factor determining the rise in agricultural productivity prior to the mid-nineteenth century and that agricultural supply was probably price elastic. The belief that the period of the industrial revolution was one of inelastic agricultural supply is shown to rest on a misinterpretation of the extant data on agricultural prices.

U.S. Steel held two-thirds of the American market in 1901, but by the 1930s its share had dropped to one-third. Such a decline is consistent with the economic theory of oligopoly pricing and capacity expansion, but the available data offer limited opportunities for formal testing of hypotheses. A close examination of U.S. Steel's early history leads us to argue that Chairman Elbert Gary's desire for price stability, his fear of antitrust litigation, and shortcomings in the firm's organizational capability constrained it from the unbridled pursuit of discounted profits that the economic theory assumes.

As the American South commenced its modern industrialization in the late nineteenth century, it found itself handicapped not simply by its poverty, but also by its lack of institutionalized means for mobilizing investment capital for manufacturing. Using evidence from the first major southern manufacturing region, the Carolina Piedmont, we argue that the resulting high information and transactions costs forced industrial promoters to rely heavily upon small, local investors who preferred safety to innovation. As a result, southern manufacturing firms were hampered in their flexibility, and southern industrial structure was skewed toward mature industries with little developmental potential.

The literature on national capital market integration in nineteenth-century America has overlooked the role of markets at a regional level. Such markets were important in reducing the possible burden of isolation by efficiently recycling local savings, and in promoting eventual integration into a national financial market. This article presents evidence that a commercial market centered on San Francisco extended into the Pacific Coast states and formed the basis for a regional financial market. The degree of market integration is measured through tests of interest rate covariability and convergence.

This article examines the economic institution utilized during the eleventh century to facilitate complex trade characterized by asymmetric information and limited legal contract enforceability. The geniza documents are employed to present the “coalition”, an economic institution based upon a reputation mechanism utilized by Mediterranean traders to confront the organizational problem associated with the exchange relations between merchants and their overseas agents. The the oretical framework explains many trade-related phenomena, especially why traders utilized specific forms of business association, and indicates the interrelations between social and economic institutions.

Paper money, a major component of the colonial money supply, was critical to the economic policies of the colonial legislatures. Why did the state legislatures relinquish the power to issue money to the new federal government through the ratification of the Constitution? Hostility between states with radically different philosophies regarding paper money raised concerns about the viability of the union, and it was this fear which led to the clause in the Federal Constitution that prohibited state paper money issues.

This article presents tests of the role of money in the price revolution (1525–1618). The hypothesis is that American specie drove European prices, and that the mechanism was the quantity theory of money buttressed by the specie-flow mechanism. Specie entered Spain, increasing Spanish prices, and then spread over Western Europe as a result of the Spanish balance-of-payments deficit, enlarging European monetary bases and price levels. Empirical verification is achieved through Granger-causality tests.

Tontines were used more extensively by France than Britain. Comparative tontine history illuminates the differing evolution of public finance in the two countries and its political consequences. Archival materials establish the number of participants in French tontines. Internal rates of return on tontines and alternatives show subsidy of tontines by the French government. Repudiation in 1770 contributed to the political attitudes of life annuitants, the most important class of state creditors, during the fiscal crisis of the late 1780s.

The article tests a variant of Lars G. Sandberg's “financial sophistication hypothesis.” Sandberg argues that Sweden had an unusually large stock of financial capital in 1850 which, along with a highly literate populace, was paramount in the subsequent economic explosion. Unable to test the hypothesis directly, we use a variant—that the financial sector was a leading sector in Swedish development—amenable to time-series tests of the Granger-causality form. These tests on data from 1861 to 1910 do not show causality from financial variables to real; indeed, the converse holds.

This article considers whether natural monopoly conditions or AT'T's market power was responsible for the formation of a single, standardized network in the United States telephone industry. It shows that AT&T was able to move the industry towards a single system under its management through a strategy of competition and compromise with competitors. The article also examines the impact of AT's actions on state regulators, concluding that public officials, lacking necessary knowledge and authority to set policy, ended up supporting AT's position in the industry.

Traditional male-female wage discrimination measures rely on residuals from earnings functions that standardize for observable characteristics. But many productivity determinants are unobservable, and existing proxies for them are often difficult to interpret. Instead of using the earnings-function approach, we estimate production functions, using data from the 1839–45 and 1860–65 French industry censuses for textiles. While most of our findings cast doubt on the idea of discrimination against women in pay, they do not rule out some other forms of discrimination, such as occupational segregation.

This article investigates the characteristics of early settlers on the midwestern farming frontier, the correlates of their geographic mobility, and the determinants of their wealth. Using evidence drawn from the 1850, 1860, and 1870 federal censuses we find average rates of growth of wealth over time that were considerably above the national average, a steeper cross-sectional relationship between wealth and age than those found for contemporary national samples, and a substantial positive effect of early arrival on the frontier on wealth levels. Very high levels of economic opportunity may have been a characteristic of the farming frontier.

Coal company towns were infamous, being described as exploitive, and charged with providing low-quality services, like sanitation. Yet, the quality of sanitation in coal towns in 1922 appears similar to that in cities of similar size, although lagging behind that in major cities. Within the coal region, company and independent towns provided similar levels of sanitation. The quality of sanitation in company towns varied in response to cost-related factors, including town age, population, and natural location. Meanwhile, workers were mobile and demanded compensating increases in wage rates in towns with lower-quality sanitation and higher rents.