This paper seeks to answer the question of what psychological preconditions must exist for institutions to determine behaviour and order our societies. We defend the notion that institutional theory may gain from such a contribution. We introduce a new theory of the mind as a network structure within which the psychological process operates to integrate insights from cognitive and affective psychology into institutional theory. We discover that institutions must be expressed as rules in mental networks which guide thinking and behaviour, be embedded within a cognitive apparatus such that they are called to mind by perception to so guide thinking and behaviour and be anchored to emotion such that they are endowed with urgency in order for them to have a hold on individual behaviour. From this theory we derive definite predictions, as well as policy insights.

Development scholars have identified several Hofstede (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions as critically important determinants of long-run economic development across countries. Does economic progress, in turn, shape culture in a predictable direction? This paper investigates whether economic change since 1970 has induced shifts in five of the Hofstede value orientations in a sample of up to 72 countries. To achieve identification, we employ a unique data set on country-level cleavages in the values of two non-overlapping age cohorts approximately one generation (30 years) apart, on average. We find evidence that faster-growing countries during the period of coming of age and personality development of the younger cohort witnessed the rise of more individualistic and politically egalitarian generations, suggesting the existence of a self-perpetuating cycle between certain “good-for-development” cultural attitudes and economic development.

Blockchain technology has been considered a vehicle to foster development in poor countries by promoting applications such as secure delivery of humanitarian aid, digital identity services, and proof of provenance. This article examines whether (and if so, how) blockchain technology can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of foreign aid governance, thereby moving beyond completely anonymous contexts. Foreign aid governance is plagued by lack of credible commitments among states, which are further exacerbated by information asymmetries and which often undermine aid effectiveness. In this context, blockchain technology holds two promises. First, through the guaranteed execution of smart contracts, it can strengthen the credibility of state commitments, for example collective burden-sharing rules among a group of donors or recipient country compliance with policy conditionality in return for aid. Second, through leveraging prediction markets, blockchain technology can allay information problems related to the verification of real-world events along the entire aid delivery chain.

We begin with a process-oriented model of science according to which signals concerning scientific reputation serve both to coordinate the plans of individuals in the scientific domain and to ensure that the knowledge that emerges from interactions between scientists and the environment is reliable. Under normal circumstances, scientific order emerges from the publication–citation–reputation (PCR) process of science. We adopt and extend F. A. Hayek's epistemology according to which knowledge affords successful plan-based action and we employ this in the development of an epistemic theory of social order. We propose that external interferences with the PCR process have distorting effects on scientific knowledge and, thus, on scientific and social order more broadly. We support this claim by describing the history of the US federal government's development of standardized dietary guidelines for American consumers and its concomitant interference in the PCR process of nutritional science. We conclude that this interference contributed to social disorder in dietary science and beyond.

We investigate whether and how economic integration increases state capacity. This important relationship has not been studied in detail so far. We put together a conceptual framework that highlights what we call the Montesquieu, Weber and Smith channels to guide our analysis. Each of these corresponds to a series of mechanisms in three distinct institutional arenas: judiciary, bureaucracy and competition policy. To test our framework, we introduce a new panel of institutional reform measures that allow us to investigate how changes in these three arenas interact with each other and what sequence of changes yields increases in state capacity. The yearly data set covers all the 17 candidate countries to join the European Union (EU) after the 1995 enlargement. Deep integration, we find, can induce broad institutional change by providing incentives for simultaneous change in core state institutions. Bureaucratic independence and judicial capacity seem to be the key engine of the process engendered by the prospect of EU membership. Yet early and abrupt removal of external anchors might generate significant backsliding, or reversals, in domestic institutional change.

Frank A. Fetter is often classified as an American representative of the Austrian school, yet surprisingly, there is practically no published record of his views of the Austrians or theirs of him, and there is no indication that he ever seriously interacted with them after the First World War. However, Fetter enjoyed many personal and professional relationships with the Austrians, and they shared a reciprocal influence on each other's ideas that deeply influenced their respective research programs. This paper draws on unpublished archival records to explore Fetter's unique place in the history of economics, in particular, his positive and negative interactions with the leading individuals and institutions of the Austrian school. Their half-century of influence sheds light on Fetter and his role in American economics, but also brings to light a wide range of information about the lives, works, and personal relations of the Austrians that have not been included in their biographies or institutional histories.

This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of trust by investigating how the quality of local services influences individuals’ generalized trust and trust in local governments. Using data from Italian national statistical office (Istat) Aspects of Daily Life survey, after building a new measure for the quality of local services, we study its effect on individuals’ trust using linear regressions techniques. Our findings suggest that good local public services have a positive impact on individuals’ trust, the effect being stronger for trust in local institutions. Our results are robust to potential endogeneity issues, tested using a two-step GMM estimation procedure, and to potential omitted variables bias, according to the method proposed by Altonji et al. (2005).

The problem of financial stability is political and institutional, rather than narrowly economic. To achieve a more resilient financial system, we need to pay attention to the incentives of actors who have the power to act discretionarily, and to the knowledge limitations of such actors in the face of substantial complexity and uncertainty. The literature on polycentric governance and institutional resilience provides key insights that the literature on financial stability has thus far neglected. We offer an analysis based on the “design principles” for robust governance institutions proposed by Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom. We apply these principles to banking systems and explore under what conditions a banking system can be expected to discover rules that align private incentives with broader financial stability, and generate the necessary knowledge to govern such a complex system. This perspective challenges both “microprudential” and “macroprudential” approaches, which assume a monocentric financial and banking regulator.

How do firms combine a broad range of contract enforcement mechanisms into coherent governance structures? How often are distinct structures used in an economy? We develop a new empirical approach, based on latent class analysis, to answer these questions. Economy-level data from Hungary are used to derive a data-driven typology of contractual governance between firms. The joint use of law, morality, self-enforcing contracts, reputation and community norms is examined. They are shown to be combined into bilateral, third-party or comprehensive governance structures. The crucial governance choice is whether to move beyond bilateralism and, if yes, whether to use a mixture of (formal and informal) third-party mechanisms as a substitute or a complement. Complementarity is much more common. We find no instances of ‘impersonal exchange’; the law never stands alone. By implication, economic development may be best understood as a process from a narrower towards a broader set of enforcement mechanisms.

Decades of research show that economic freedom is highly correlated with desirable economic outcomes both internationally and locally. Yet we still know little about the transition from low to high levels of economic freedom, particularly for institutions under local control. This research shows that while economic freedom in the United States is decreasing with regard to institutions under national control, it is increasing with regard to institutions under state and local control. Economic freedom increases gradually among the states, driven primarily by increasing labor market freedom. Decreases in economic freedom, on the other hand, occur sharply, often following stark changes to state fiscal policies.

We examine the effectiveness of bankruptcy institutions at promoting socially efficient allocation of resources. Under the Slovenian simplified reorganization procedure, firms with rejected reorganization proposals are not automatically liquidated. This unique institutional feature facilitates an estimation of the extent of different types of filtering failures. Based on an ex-post conceptualization of firm viability, Type I errors (the acceptance of plans by non-viable firms) are more likely than Type II errors (the rejection of plans by viable firms) and the overall incidence of filtering failure is 27%. Based on an ex-ante conceptualization of firm viability, any given reduction in Type II errors would give rise to three times as many Type I errors. We contextualize our findings in the light of prior results in the literature, alternative mechanisms for insolvency resolution, and related bankruptcy reorganization schemes internationally where courts are awarded a comparatively more prominent role.