The history of science abounds with self-reflections about whether its questions, methods, and theories are sufficiently rigorous to clarify complex unknowns. Metascientific accounts pervade our own fields of language and cognition, which coincidentally coalesced when “20 Questions” was a popular television show (Van Deventer, Reference Van Deventer1952). After Newell's (Reference Newell1973) prescient warnings about playing 20 questions with Nature, current views about language–cognition interactions vary along many metascientific dimensions. We are thus grateful to Almaatouq et al. for reanimating Newell's proposal in their paper, which names, operationally defines, and advocates for an integrative modeling approach.
Cognitive scientists have long debated how language and cognition interact. These debates take many forms, including the consequences of bilingualism on mind and brain, often referred to as the “bilingual advantage” (see Titone, Gullifer, Subramaniapillai, Rajah, & Baum, Reference Titone, Gullifer, Subramaniapillai, Rajah, Baum, Bialystok and Sullivan2017, for historic overview). The initial rationale of this hypothesis is that people who speak multiple languages have heightened daily experience suppressing/inhibiting knowledge of one language when speaking another (e.g., Bialystok, Craik, Klein, & Viswanathan, Reference Bialystok, Craik, Klein and Viswanathan2004). Because researchers presumed that suppression/inhibition is part of a domain-general cognitive control capacity, the bilingual advantages position hypothesized that this daily practice would preferentially strengthen cognitive control for bilinguals compared to monolinguals, causing them to perform better on cognitive control tasks.
When the bilingual advantage hypothesis emerged (Bialystok et al., Reference Bialystok, Craik, Klein and Viswanathan2004; see also Peal & Lambert, Reference Peal and Lambert1962), it was refreshing in its celebration of bilinguals' cognitive capacities compared to biased and culturally damaging notions of bilingualism as a liability (e.g., Goodenough, Reference Goodenough1926; Saer, Reference Saer1923). Nevertheless, it was much too simple in a “20-questions,” yes–no binary way. While early findings were supportive, it did not take long for mixed findings to emerge. Relevant to our commentary are researchers' attributions for the sources of these mixed findings, which we class in two nonmutually exclusive ways – a “replication crisis” account, and – building upon Almaatouq et al. – an “integrative modeling/design space” account.
A “replication crisis” account presumes that replicable findings are true, and nonreplicable findings are false. However, jumping to conclusions prematurely risks perpetuating a 20-questions mindset by presuming that all studies are interchangeable (i.e., commensurate), when they may differ in a myriad of incommensurate ways (e.g., Are bilingual and monolingual groups comparably designated? Are all bilinguals the same in terms of language and cognitive experiences? Are all geographies equally supportive of bilingualism? Are all cognitive tasks equivalent? Does suppression/inhibition mean the same thing across all cognitive tasks?). Further, a potentially erroneous corollary of a reflexive replication crisis view is that there is one general cognitive reality applicable to all bilingual people, and that any experiment is an equipotent reflection of that reality.
In contrast, an “integrative modeling/design space” account takes mixed findings at face value and actively accounts for systematic differences across study details that could have elicited them. Indeed, much of our field has moved into this post-20-questions phase of inquiry (e.g., Navarro-Torres, Beatty-Martínez, Kroll, & Green, Reference Navarro-Torres, Beatty-Martínez, Kroll and Green2021), and now investigates the links between individual differences among bilinguals and a variety of performance outcomes (e.g., Wagner, Bekas, & Bialystok, Reference Wagner, Bekas and Bialystok2023). As one example, our group developed new tools and methods for capturing nuanced differences among bilinguals (language entropy, social network analysis), including analytic approaches (e.g., machine-learning approaches such as leave one out cross-validation) that distinguish explanation and prediction, referred to in the target article (Gullifer, Pivneva, Whitford, Sheikh, & Titone, Reference Gullifer, Pivneva, Whitford, Sheikh and Titone2023; Gullifer & Titone, Reference Gullifer and Titone2021; see also Hofman et al., Reference Hofman, Watts, Athey, Garip, Griffiths, Kleinberg and Yarkoni2021).
As another example compatible with the target article's research cartography idea, our group posited the systems framework of bilingualism (Titone & Tiv, Reference Titone and Tiv2023; Tiv, Gullifer, Feng, & Titone, Reference Tiv, Gullifer, Feng and Titone2020; Tiv et al., Reference Tiv, Kutlu, Gullifer, Feng, Doucerain and Titone2022; see also Beatty-Martínez & Titone, Reference Beatty-Martínez and Titone2021), which sketches a design space for language–cognition interactions. This framework builds upon socioecological accounts of human behavior (e.g., Atkinson et al., Reference Atkinson, Byrnes, Doran, Duff, Ellis, Hall and Tarone2016; Bronfenbrenner, Reference Bronfenbrenner1977; de Bot, Lowie, & Verspoor, Reference de Bot, Lowie and Verspoor2007), and our prior efforts to encourage researchers to abandon simple bilingual/monolingual group comparisons for tasks that may not tap into the same cognitive constructs (e.g., Baum & Titone, Reference Baum and Titone2014; Beatty-Martínez & Titone, Reference Beatty-Martínez and Titone2021, Reference Beatty-Martínez, Titone, Short and Hell2024; Gullifer & Titone, Reference Gullifer and Titone2021; Titone & Baum, Reference Titone and Baum2014; Tiv et al., Reference Tiv, Gullifer, Feng and Titone2020). Accordingly, people's individual language and cognitive behaviors are embedded within a multilevel set of nested social influences (i.e., daily interactions, local neighborhoods, laws regulating language use). Thus, to fully describe language–cognition interactions among bilinguals (or anyone), one must attend to these influences, and how participants across studies systematically vary in these ways. This means that any one study is but a single point within a much larger space, that mixed findings may be meaningful, and that conclusions about bilingualism may be less general or unitary than one might originally believe. Such an approach respects the complexity of the phenomena such that, regardless of where the data ultimately lead, our conclusions will be more rigorously and honestly earned.
In closing, we agree with Almaatouq et al. that it is advantageous to move beyond “one-at-a-time binary paradigms” through studies that position themselves within realistic multidimensional design spaces (i.e., a preplanned meta-analytic approach). We are ever mindful that our work on language and cognition is conducted within a unique multilingual city where language use is legally regulated and often interpersonally, culturally, and politically charged. Consequently, what is possible for us to capture empirically about language–cognition interactions will be necessarily impacted by our unique positionality. Importantly, we are not alone, as every research group has its own unique positionality that must be considered. Thus, let us profit from the wisdom and humility implicit in the Almaatouq et al.'s target article and Newell's (Reference Newell1973) original proposal, by recognizing that it may not be possible for any one experiment or research group to speak definitively to an entire design space of causally dense, socially situated behavioral phenomena.
Debra Titone
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The history of science abounds with self-reflections about whether its questions, methods, and theories are sufficiently rigorous to clarify complex unknowns. Metascientific accounts pervade our own fields of language and cognition, which coincidentally coalesced when “20 Questions” was a popular television show (Van Deventer, Reference Van Deventer1952). After Newell's (Reference Newell1973) prescient warnings about playing 20 questions with Nature, current views about language–cognition interactions vary along many metascientific dimensions. We are thus grateful to Almaatouq et al. for reanimating Newell's proposal in their paper, which names, operationally defines, and advocates for an integrative modeling approach.
Cognitive scientists have long debated how language and cognition interact. These debates take many forms, including the consequences of bilingualism on mind and brain, often referred to as the “bilingual advantage” (see Titone, Gullifer, Subramaniapillai, Rajah, & Baum, Reference Titone, Gullifer, Subramaniapillai, Rajah, Baum, Bialystok and Sullivan2017, for historic overview). The initial rationale of this hypothesis is that people who speak multiple languages have heightened daily experience suppressing/inhibiting knowledge of one language when speaking another (e.g., Bialystok, Craik, Klein, & Viswanathan, Reference Bialystok, Craik, Klein and Viswanathan2004). Because researchers presumed that suppression/inhibition is part of a domain-general cognitive control capacity, the bilingual advantages position hypothesized that this daily practice would preferentially strengthen cognitive control for bilinguals compared to monolinguals, causing them to perform better on cognitive control tasks.
When the bilingual advantage hypothesis emerged (Bialystok et al., Reference Bialystok, Craik, Klein and Viswanathan2004; see also Peal & Lambert, Reference Peal and Lambert1962), it was refreshing in its celebration of bilinguals' cognitive capacities compared to biased and culturally damaging notions of bilingualism as a liability (e.g., Goodenough, Reference Goodenough1926; Saer, Reference Saer1923). Nevertheless, it was much too simple in a “20-questions,” yes–no binary way. While early findings were supportive, it did not take long for mixed findings to emerge. Relevant to our commentary are researchers' attributions for the sources of these mixed findings, which we class in two nonmutually exclusive ways – a “replication crisis” account, and – building upon Almaatouq et al. – an “integrative modeling/design space” account.
A “replication crisis” account presumes that replicable findings are true, and nonreplicable findings are false. However, jumping to conclusions prematurely risks perpetuating a 20-questions mindset by presuming that all studies are interchangeable (i.e., commensurate), when they may differ in a myriad of incommensurate ways (e.g., Are bilingual and monolingual groups comparably designated? Are all bilinguals the same in terms of language and cognitive experiences? Are all geographies equally supportive of bilingualism? Are all cognitive tasks equivalent? Does suppression/inhibition mean the same thing across all cognitive tasks?). Further, a potentially erroneous corollary of a reflexive replication crisis view is that there is one general cognitive reality applicable to all bilingual people, and that any experiment is an equipotent reflection of that reality.
In contrast, an “integrative modeling/design space” account takes mixed findings at face value and actively accounts for systematic differences across study details that could have elicited them. Indeed, much of our field has moved into this post-20-questions phase of inquiry (e.g., Navarro-Torres, Beatty-Martínez, Kroll, & Green, Reference Navarro-Torres, Beatty-Martínez, Kroll and Green2021), and now investigates the links between individual differences among bilinguals and a variety of performance outcomes (e.g., Wagner, Bekas, & Bialystok, Reference Wagner, Bekas and Bialystok2023). As one example, our group developed new tools and methods for capturing nuanced differences among bilinguals (language entropy, social network analysis), including analytic approaches (e.g., machine-learning approaches such as leave one out cross-validation) that distinguish explanation and prediction, referred to in the target article (Gullifer, Pivneva, Whitford, Sheikh, & Titone, Reference Gullifer, Pivneva, Whitford, Sheikh and Titone2023; Gullifer & Titone, Reference Gullifer and Titone2021; see also Hofman et al., Reference Hofman, Watts, Athey, Garip, Griffiths, Kleinberg and Yarkoni2021).
As another example compatible with the target article's research cartography idea, our group posited the systems framework of bilingualism (Titone & Tiv, Reference Titone and Tiv2023; Tiv, Gullifer, Feng, & Titone, Reference Tiv, Gullifer, Feng and Titone2020; Tiv et al., Reference Tiv, Kutlu, Gullifer, Feng, Doucerain and Titone2022; see also Beatty-Martínez & Titone, Reference Beatty-Martínez and Titone2021), which sketches a design space for language–cognition interactions. This framework builds upon socioecological accounts of human behavior (e.g., Atkinson et al., Reference Atkinson, Byrnes, Doran, Duff, Ellis, Hall and Tarone2016; Bronfenbrenner, Reference Bronfenbrenner1977; de Bot, Lowie, & Verspoor, Reference de Bot, Lowie and Verspoor2007), and our prior efforts to encourage researchers to abandon simple bilingual/monolingual group comparisons for tasks that may not tap into the same cognitive constructs (e.g., Baum & Titone, Reference Baum and Titone2014; Beatty-Martínez & Titone, Reference Beatty-Martínez and Titone2021, Reference Beatty-Martínez, Titone, Short and Hell2024; Gullifer & Titone, Reference Gullifer and Titone2021; Titone & Baum, Reference Titone and Baum2014; Tiv et al., Reference Tiv, Gullifer, Feng and Titone2020). Accordingly, people's individual language and cognitive behaviors are embedded within a multilevel set of nested social influences (i.e., daily interactions, local neighborhoods, laws regulating language use). Thus, to fully describe language–cognition interactions among bilinguals (or anyone), one must attend to these influences, and how participants across studies systematically vary in these ways. This means that any one study is but a single point within a much larger space, that mixed findings may be meaningful, and that conclusions about bilingualism may be less general or unitary than one might originally believe. Such an approach respects the complexity of the phenomena such that, regardless of where the data ultimately lead, our conclusions will be more rigorously and honestly earned.
In closing, we agree with Almaatouq et al. that it is advantageous to move beyond “one-at-a-time binary paradigms” through studies that position themselves within realistic multidimensional design spaces (i.e., a preplanned meta-analytic approach). We are ever mindful that our work on language and cognition is conducted within a unique multilingual city where language use is legally regulated and often interpersonally, culturally, and politically charged. Consequently, what is possible for us to capture empirically about language–cognition interactions will be necessarily impacted by our unique positionality. Importantly, we are not alone, as every research group has its own unique positionality that must be considered. Thus, let us profit from the wisdom and humility implicit in the Almaatouq et al.'s target article and Newell's (Reference Newell1973) original proposal, by recognizing that it may not be possible for any one experiment or research group to speak definitively to an entire design space of causally dense, socially situated behavioral phenomena.
Financial support
The authors gratefully acknowledge past and current support from the following sources: Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) Discovery Grant (Titone), Canada Research Chairs (Titone), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight and Insight Development Grants (Titone, Gullifer), National Council for Science and Technology – CONACyT (Hernández-Rivera), and National Institutes of Health (F32-AG064810 to Beatty-Martínez and Gullifer).
Competing interest
None.